BOTSWANA

Politics and Society

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(editors)

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THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE, 1870-1910 by Jeff Ramsay

In 1885 Britain occupied southern Botswana, beginning a period of colonial rule that was extended to the northern part of the country in 1890. Thereafter, until the 1966 restoration of independence, the territory was known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It was hoped that the word "protectorate" would reassure Batswana that they were not a colony. As "protected" rulers local dikgosi were periodically reassured that they could continue to govern their own people.

During the first quarter of century of British overrule there was, nonetheless, extensive interference in the internal affairs of the protected merafe, which in 1899 were demarcated as seven (later nine) Tribal Reserves. British authority over other areas of the country, gazetted as either Crownlands or freehold farms, was even greater. Yet despite the imposition of often heavy handed and unpopular administrative measures a political consensus emerged among the dikgosi and other leading Batswana in favour of the retention of British imperial authority as a lesser evil to the alternative of incorporation into the settler states of South Africa and/or the Rhodesias. Thus, by 1910, the dikgosi themselves were defining "protectorate" as an imperial shield against settler political control.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE

The British announced their intention to occupy southern Botswana in a January 1885 Order-in-Council. There immediate motive was to keep the territory from falling under the Germans. In 1884 the Germans had occupied much of neighbouring South-West Africa (Namibia). The establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was thus part of the wider late nineteenth century scramble for Africa.

The Protectorate was imposed on Batswana. No kgosi asked for it and only three- Khama III of Bangwato, Gaseitsiwe I of Bangwaketse and Sechele I of Bakwena- were consulted afterwards. Khama welcomed it, while Gaseitsiwe and Sechele reluctantly accepted. In so doing all three knew from the experiences of other Africans that it was futile to resist Britain's military power. In particular they were aware of how their longstanding allies the Batlhaping had been crushed in the 1870s by British howitzers, Maxim guns and Lee-Medford rifles.

Griqualand West and the confederation scheme

In the aftermath of the Batswana victory over the Boers in 1852-53, the merafe living between the Orange and Zambezi rivers had for two decades remained free of white domination. Thereafter communities living south of the Molopo River, mostly Barolong, Batlhaping and Batlharo were conquered by the British. In the process they lost most of their land, which the British government handed over to white settlers. (1)

The British colonization of the southern Batswana began with the 1871 annexation of the newly discovered diamond fields region in and around Kimberley. Although over 10,000 Batlhaping lived in the area the British claimed that the entire region belonged to a Griqua group numbering only a few hundred. Conveniently these Griqua had supposedly asked for British protection. The area thus became the British Crown Colony of Griqualand West. From 1876 Griqualand West's blacks, including its Griqua, were forced live in overcrowded locations after most of their land was given to white settlers.

In an attempt to counter further encroachment by either the British or Boers various Batlhaping dikgosi, along with Montshiwa I of Barolong booRatshidi and Gaseitsiwe, attempted to join together to form a confederation or loose union of their merafe. The idea was not entirely new. Since the 1852-53 war dikgosi in the region had maintained a defensive alliance. In 1865 Gaseitsiwe, Montshiwa and Sechele had threatened to jointly go to war when the Transvaal Boers tried to takeover Lehurutshe. The Boers backed down. (2)

The idea of forming "a general confederation against the common enemy" was pushed by Joseph Ludorf, a Wesleyan missionary who acted as Montshiwa's secretary. In an October 1871 letter copied to the Bangwaketse, Barolong and Batlhaping dikgosi, he wrote:

"And now chiefs: rulers of the land, I appeal to you. Awake: arise and unite soon before your trophy is torn asunder by wolves; come ye together, make protective laws; stop all breaches and gaps and close your gaps. Safeguard the heritage of Tau your ancestor. Hear ye all chiefs: Come together and unite."(3)

By November Ludorf had drafted a constitution for "The United Barolong, Batlhaping and Bangwaketse Nation "and began appealing for diplomatic status as its representative. At about the same time Sechele agreed to join. (4) But the confederation never materialized. Although the dikgosi continued to work for greater unity after Ludorf's sudden death in January 1872, they were frustrated by their inability to resist further British aggression.

In 1878 both the Batlhaping and Griqua in Griqualand West rebelled against white domination. With their guns the Batlhaping put up a strong resistance, defeating one enemy column in a 2 July 1878 Battle at Kho. But British firepower was far superior. The main body of resisters were surrounded at Dithakong, which fell to the invaders on 24 July 1878, after a three-hour artillery barrage. (5)

Using the supposed need to protect the London Missionary Society (LMS) mission at Kudumane as an excuse, a British commander, Colonel Charles Warren, then invaded the Batswana lands up to the Molopo River demanding the submission of the local dikgosi. Those who resisted were fined, imprisoned and/or deposed. (6)

In 1880 it was widely expected that British overrule would soon be extended north of the Molopo as well. Earlier, in 1876-77 a British agent named Alex Bailie was also sent north to the Bakwena, Bakgatla bagaKgafela, Baseleka, Bangwato, and Amandebele "to secure a constant supply of cheap labour to satisfy the large wants of the Diamond Field labour market."(7) When the

Bangwato Kgosi Khama asked for British support in keeping Boers out of his territory, Bailie interpreted it as a request for British "protection". Subsequently the British authorities in Pretoria had sought to impose a settlement on the territorial disputes then disrupting relations between Bakwena, Bakgatla bagaKgafela, Bangwaketse and Balete in south-eastern Botswana. (8)

Warren's invasion and Bailie's mission were part of a wider policy of British expansionism designed to bring much of southern Africa under their control. Between 1877 and 1881 the British army also fought with the Abaxhosa, Amazulu, Basotho, Bapedi, and Transvaal Boers. A change of government in London led to a British pullback in 1881. The Transvaal, northern Kwazulu, and Batswana territory north of Griqualand West were all temporarily abandoned.

Wars against white mercenaries

Warren's invasion, along with a flow of refugees from Griqualand West, had destabilized the Barolong and independent Batlhaping. In the aftermath of the 1881 withdrawal, Montshiwa and his counterpart Mankurwane, the leading Batlhaping kgosi, were attacked by white mercenaries or "filibusters".(9) These mercenaries, who included both Boers and British, claimed to fighting on behalf of two minor dikgosi, Moswete and Mossweu, who had already submitted to Transvaal Boer overrule. Their real interest, though, was in grabbing land for themselves. Mankurwane made his situation worse by hiring his own mercenaries, who later turned on him.

In 1882 the mercenaries set up two small states, the Stellaland Republic on Batlhaping land, and the Goshen Republic on Barolong land. Imperialists in the Cape Colony, led by the mine owner Cecil Rhodes, now joined local missionaries and traders in calling for British intervention. They maintained that the mercenaries were disrupting the flow of goods and mine labour along the trade route between the Cape and central Africa.

The arguments of Cape based imperialists were strengthened by the sudden April 1884 German occupation of the South-West African coast.(10) At the same time the German navy was also seeking a harbour in Tsongaland, the coastal area between the Transvaal, Portuguese Mozambique and northern Kwazulu, which was then recognized as a British sphere of influence. The British Colonial Office now also feared that the two republics would become a land link between the Germans and the Transvaal Boers. In the process the route between the Cape Colony and central Africa through Botswana would be closed to British commerce and potential political expansion. The Transvaal's new President, Paul Kruger, favoured cooperation with Germany as a counterweight to Britain's regional predominance.

In February 1884 the LMS missionary John Mackenzie received a Colonial Office appointment as "Deputy Commissioner" with instructions to cooperate with the Stellaland mercenaries in establishing a Bechuanaland Protectorate south of the Molopo. (11) In August he was replaced by Rhodes, after failing to reach an agreement with the Stellalanders. Rhodes quickly won the mercenaries support by recognizing their land claims against the Batlhaping.

The Goshenites were less successful. Montshiwa's position was strengthened in 1883 when Gaseitsiwe, Sechele, and the Bakgatla bagaKgafela Kgosi Linchwe I agreed to join him in a new alliance. (12) The Goshenites were then pushed to the Transvaal border farm of Rooigrond. On

12 May 1884 the Barolong raided the farm, burning down the mercenaries' camp. When a retaliatory raid resulted in the death of Montshiwa's son Makgetla, the Kgosi reportedly told his people":

"Who think you must die for the fatherland if not the princes? Think you an enemy's bullet or ball respects a king's son, or that a king's son is dearer to his parents any more than a commoner's son to his parents? Away with your heaviness of heart: Makgetla has died gloriously because he died as we should be prepared to die; so on with the struggle for our land and freedom."(13)

Another raid on Bangwaketse and Barolong cattle posts inside Botswana led to the last battle of the war. On 1 August 1884 Goshenite raiders were intercepted by Bangwaketse and Barolong near Mafikeng. In the engagement 181 of the Batswana- 112 Barolong, 67 Bangwaketse and 2 white sympathizers- and some 50 Boers were killed before the raiders retreated back into the Transvaal. (14)

Events came to a head in September 1884 when Kruger claimed that Montshiwa had accepted Transvaal protection! In support of this he produced a document with an "X" forged besides Montshiwa's name. This attempted bluff only convinced the Colonial Office that the time had come for stronger action. Even though Kruger soon withdrew his claim, the British decided to secure the area with a 4,000-man military expedition under the command of now General Sir Charles Warren, also known as "Ragalase" to the Batswana.

The Warren Expedition

By the time Warren's forces arrived among the Batlhaping and Barolong in January 1885 the region south of the Molopo was relatively calm. With Mackenzie serving as his advisor, Warren visited Mankurwane and Montshiwa. The two signed documents, drafted by Mackenzie, in which they agreed to submit to British overrule. Warren also met with Kruger who promised to prevent further raids on the Protectorate from the Transvaal. (15)

Warren's main task then became the enforcement of Rhodes' land promises to the Stellalanders. By May 1886 a Land Commission, chaired Rhodes' close associate Sidney Shippard, had robbed the Batswana living south of the Molopo of 92% of their land.(16) While 13% of the land was awarded to the mercenaries as freehold farms, another 79% was taken by the British Government as Crownlands. Shippard, who became known to Batswana as "Morena Maaka" ("Lord of Lies"), was then appointed as Bechuanaland's Administrator. (17)

Meanwhile, in an Order-in-Council dated 27 January 1885, the Colonial Office foreclosed the possibility of a linkup between German South-West Africa and the Transvaal by extending the Bechuanaland Protectorate north of the Molopo to include the southern half Botswana up to the 22nd parallel of south latitude.(18) After first notifying the Germans, in March 1885 Warren was instructed to communicate this development to "Kings" Sechele and Khama.(19) He set out to do this the following month, crossing the Molopo with seventy men. The timing was appropriate as a smaller German expedition passed through northern Botswana to Shoshong only a few months later. (20)

Some Bakwena had already read about the proclamation of the Protectorate when Warren formally notified the Molepolole kgotla of their new status on 27 April 1885. There he was immediately challenged by Sechele's son Sebele:

"Sebele- What in us has brought this on, that the country should be taken from us?
Warren- Does Sebele know what it means by the country being taken?
Sebele- Seeing what I now know, the boundary line running northwards about Tati and round west in the Kalahari takes us all in, therefore it is that I ask, what in us has brought this on?
Warren- But does Sebele know what being taken means?
Sebele- I have been told, and I have seen in the papers, that our country is taken, and we the Bakwena were never consulted; therefore, I ask why it has been taken?
Warren- I said that a Protectorate had been established, I did not say the country had been taken from them.
Sebele- What is the Protectorate for?
Warren- Does Sebele consider his tribe requires no protection?
Sebele- What is meant by protection?
Warren- The protection may mean protection from the inside or protection from the outside.
Sebele- When a man takes a shield and holds it up, he holds it against something; what is it that we are to be protected against?
Warren- Is there nothing you want protection against?
Sebele- You may see it, but we the Bakwena do not see it yet.
Warren- Does Sebele know what has just taken place down to the south at Montshioa's?
Sebele- We, the Bakwena, are not Barolong.
Warren- What does Sebele mean?
Sebele- A stem-buck cannot protect itself, but God protects it and lets it live.
Warren- Was it the same with you when you came here as refugees fleeing from the Boers?
Sebele- A stem-buck gets into difficulties, but when it does so it must get out of them, and God helps it to do so.
Warren- Then does Sebele wish me to tell the Queen that the Bakwena are strong enough to protect themselves?
Sebele- We do not want any protection; we are strong enough to protect ourselves."(21)

For his part Sechele stated:

"I do not know the exact object of your coming here. When we see you appear here, we do not know if it will be life or death to us, but that we know it will be death to us if you do to us as the Boers do to the Bahurutze [sic]. We shall be dead men if you do to us as the Boers did to the Bakatla [sic.] at Rustenburg. If you talk merely in parables, we shall not understand you easily. I have seen a newspaper in which it is said I asked for protection, also Ghasitsive [sic.] and Khama. I do not understand this asking. The Bakwena were collected together as they are now when I went to the Cape to get guns and powder to defend myself with. I went with Sanwe, Mr. Sam Edwards, here. There are others who can testify if I ever asked for anything beside to be allowed to buy guns and powder; to be allowed to obtain weapons the same as what the Boers had, to defend myself against them. As to our friendship I do not know why, because of that our country should be taken possession of. Why is known only to you white people and the missionary who lives here."(22)

Sechele was perhaps not being absolutely straightforward. He must have been aware for months that some form of British protection was inevitable. In a December 1884 letter by his L.M.S. missionary, Rodger Price, to the Premier of the Cape Colony, Thomas Upington, he was said to be willing "to enter into communication with you or any other duly appointed person, with a view to himself and his country coming under the protection of the Queen of England."(23) Yet, after two days of discussions, Warren left Molepolole having failed to win Sechele's formal submission. A newspaper witness reported "that England's prestige had received another rude shock", adding:

"Sechele is thoroughly English in all his sympathies. But his son [Sebele] is fearful that in trusting to English protection he will be reduced to the condition of the Native Chiefs in the Transvaal. He is highly intelligent, and shrewd enough to distrust protection when he cannot see a single Chief in South Africa who benefitted by it."(24)

Sechele certainly had no illusions about resisting the British. As early as 1868 when asked if he would fight them, he had stated: "How could I? The great English would eat me up in one day."(25)

Warren proceeded to Shoshong where his announcement of the Protectorate was enthusiastically welcomed by Khama, though most of the Bangwato were later said to be opposed to the British presence. On 13 May 1885 Khama signed a document, drafted by Mackenzie, in which it was stated:

"I, Khama, Chief of the Bamangwato, with my younger brothers, and heads of my town, express my gratitude at the coming of the messengers of the Queen of England, and for the announcement to me of the Protectorate which has been established by desire of the Queen, and which has come to help the law of the Bamangwato also. I give thanks for the words of the Queen, which I have heard, and I accept of (receive) the friendship and protection of the Government of England within the Bamangwato country.

"Further I give to the Queen to make laws and to change them in the country of the Bamangwato, with reference to both black and white. Nevertheless, I am not baffled in the Government of my town, or in deciding cases among my own people according to custom; but again, I do not refuse help in these offices. Although this is so, I have to say that there are certain laws of my country which the Queen of England finds in operation, and which are advantageous for my people, and I wish these laws should be established, and not taken away by the Government of England. I refer to the law concerning intoxicating drinks, that they should not enter the country of the Bamangwato whether among black or white people. I refer further to our law which declares that the lands of the Bamangwato are not saleable. I say this law also is good. Let it be upheld and continue to be law."(26)

In accepting protection Khama, at Mackenzie's urging, further offered the British large tracts of land so that "the English people should come and live in it". Khama hoped that by making this offer his people would not be made to pay taxes to the British. Much of the land he offered was

actually occupied by neighbouring groups such as the Bakalanga, Batawana, Bakwena, and Bakgatla.

Warren then returned to Molepolole where Sechele was pressured to reach a similar agreement. The Mokwena agreed to give up his own claims to Bakgatla-occupied lands east of the Ngotwane and parts of the western Kgalagadi bordering on Namibia "as long as my people should be able to hunt there." He further conceded: "Concerning the laws which shall be established in the country, I wish to rule among my people according to custom, but I give to the Queen to rule among white people wherever they are." Later, when also pressed for an agreement, Gaseitsiwe made a similar gesture, giving up his residual claims to Gamalete and Hukuntsi. (27)

Though they knew that Gaseitsiwe and Sechele's land concessions were worthless, Warren and Mackenzie hoped to use Khama's "magnificent offer" as the basis for creating a white settler colony. They submitted a plan to carve out 7,000 farms of about 6,000 acres each. Fortunately, this idea was overruled from above. The Colonial Office accepted its South African High Commissioner's conclusion that:

"As to the country north of the Molopo River....it appears to me that we have no interest in it, except as a road to the interior. I would suggest, therefore, that we should confine ourselves to preventing that part of the Protectorate being occupied by either Filibusters or Foreign powers, doing, for present, as little as possible in the way of administration or settlement. The Chiefs, Gatziziba [Gaseitsiwe], Sechele, and Khama, might be left to govern their own tribes in their own fashion, and their offer of lands to Her Majesty's Government ...should be refused."(28)

It was therefore decided that the British presence north of the Molopo would be limited to occasional police patrols to "protect Sechele's country and the country neighbouring to Shoshong." This circumstance suited the Batswana who were reported to have an "utter distaste for the rule or control of the white man."(29)

On 30 September 1885 British Bechuanaland were administratively divided by the Molopo River. The merafe south of the river, who now lived in the shadow of white settlers, became part of the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland, which in 1895 was incorporated into the Cape Colony. The Bechuanaland Protectorate survived north of the Molopo to become Botswana. (30)

The consolidation of colonial rule

Although the British declared their Protectorate in 1885, they did not begin to exercise full colonial control over Botswana until 1890. Given the Colonial Office's initial belief that their interests north of the Molopo were limited, they saw little purpose in spending money to establish a full-fledged colonial administration. Therefore, at first, they interfered little in the domestic affairs of the merafe. Thereafter a system of "Indirect Rule" gradually evolved, under which colonial officials ruled through dikgosi, who were no longer free to run their own peoples' affairs. Indirect Rule was always based on the imperialists' belief that they alone had the ability to hold ultimate authority.

The British decided to impose a more comprehensive form of colonial rule after 1890 because their view of the Protectorate had changed. In 1885 their concern had been limited to keeping the Germans from linking up with the Transvaal Boers. But by 1890 the Protectorate was seen as a base from which British imperialism could expand northward into central Africa.

Rhodes and the British South Africa Company

The leading figure pushing for the expansion of colonial rule into Botswana and central Africa was Cecil Rhodes. He had become one of the wealthiest men in the world through his ownership of South African diamond and gold mines. Rhodes also hoped to control the wealth of central Africa. In this he was supported by his friend "Morena Maaka" Shippard, who was now responsible for the administration of both the Colony of British Bechuanaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In 1888 Rhodes, through an agent named Rudd, obtained a concession or agreement from the Amandebele Nkosi Lobengula, which granted him exclusive mining rights in western Zimbabwe. This occurred after Shippard had visited Lobengula. He and his assistant, former L.M.S. missionary J.S. Moffat (son of Robert Moffat), misled the king. If he signed the Rudd Concession, they told him, he would gain British support in his efforts to limit the activities of white fortune seekers in his country. When he saw that he had been tricked Lobengula tried to break the agreement, but his protests were ignored. (31)

Rhodes used the Rudd Concession as a basis for asking the British government to give his British South Africa Company (BSACo) permission to take control of central Africa. In October 1889 Queen Victoria issued a Royal Charter giving the BSACo the right to control the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as well as parts of central Africa on Britain's behalf. The BSACo was therefore also known as the Chartered Company.

Rhodes wanted to first take over the lands of the Amandebele and Vashona in modern Zimbabwe, which he believed were rich in gold, before he assumed the cost of running Botswana. He therefore convinced the Colonial Office to temporarily maintain its responsibility over the Protectorate. In so doing he knew he could count on Shippard's administration to assist him in his conquest of the Amandebele. Shippard became a Director of the BSACo after he left Botswana. Many of his subordinates, particularly officers in the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP), were given Chartered Company shares by Rhodes. Through such corruption Rhodes knew that Protectorate officials would serve his interests. (32)

The Kopong Conference

On his way to see Lobengula, Shippard had disturbed the dikgosi of southern Botswana with loose talk of establishing colonial rule. In the hope of calming them, Shippard accepted Sebele I's proposal that he convene a great meeting or pitso of the dikgosi. As a result most of the dikgosi, along with thousands of their followers, gathered to meet Shippard at Kopong in February 1889. (33)

Morena Maaka hoped that he could push the dikgosi into accepting colonial rule. Instead, the principal southern dikgosi Bathoen I (who had succeeded Gaseitsiwe), Linchwe, and Sebele (acting for his ailing father Sechele) joined together to oppose the continued British presence in their territories. They told Shippard that they would rather be independent. Said Linchwe:

"I do not wish either the Boers or the English to come and take our chieftainship away from us. All Bechuanas should fight together. God will protect us if the Protectorate is withdrawn, and God is the greatest Protector.(34)

Khama, however, broke ranks and promised "to help the English government in every way". Disappointed by Bathoen, Linchwe and Sebele's "defiant attitude", Shippard broke up the conference. In his report he noted:

"Khama who is thoroughly loyal and sincerely attached to the English appears to be completely isolated. He is left out of all the private meetings of the Protectorate Chiefs and seems to be regarded by them with suspicion and dislike as the white man's friend."(35)

A month later Khama claimed that he had blocked Sebele's proposal at Kopong to attack the British. The police report added: "Khama says Chiefs below blame Khama for inviting the white man in and backing them to the point of fighting them."(36)

The Orders-in-Council of 1890 and 1891

Full colonial rule was finally imposed in 1890-91 through two Orders-in Council. The first in June 1890 authorized the High Commissioner at the Cape, as the Queen's representative in Southern Africa, to: "provide for giving effect to any power or jurisdiction which Her Majesty [Queen Victoria], her heirs or successors, may at any time before or after the date of this order have within the limits of this order."(37)

These sweeping new powers were necessary because Shippard had to find a way to cancel concessions held by companies other than the BSACo. Bathoen, Linchwe, Moremi II (of Batawana), and Sebele had each sold concessions in their territories that contradicted the rights given to BSACo by the Royal Charter. Most of these rival concessions recognized the dikgosi, not Queen Victoria, as the "sovereigns of the soil". (38)

Shippard had tried to declare all non-BSACo concessions invalid earlier in 1889. He backed down when it was recognized that he had no authority to issue such an order. The British thus gave themselves absolute powers in the Protectorate by issuing the Orders-In-Council. The Order also extended the Protectorate's border to include all of northern Botswana. The peoples of Ngamiland and Chobe were thus brought into the Protectorate for the first time. (40)

But the dikgosi still claimed to be sovereigns of the soil. In the same month that the 1890 Order was issued their position was upheld by the High Commissioner's own legal advisor, W.P. Schreiner. He concluded that the proposals made by Gaseitsiwe, Khama, and Sechele, when accepting the Protectorate in 1885:

"Do not per se convey to the Crown any legal jurisdiction within the territories of those Chiefs [so that] the delegation to the British South Africa Company of a legal jurisdiction founded upon the due acceptance of the proposals referred to, would be an act requiring for its validity the approval or assent of the Chiefs concerned."(40)

After the Kopong Conference Shippard realized that the dikgosi would never voluntarily submit to colonial overrule. Indeed, in 1890 Bathoen, Linchwe, and Sebele worked together to block such British acts as the construction of a telegraph, the sinking of wells, and the stationing of police in their territories. When their protests failed, they turned to lawyers. Their claim to be sovereigns of the soil thus posed a serious legal challenge to making the BSACo the rulers of the Protectorate.

To overcome the dikgosi's objections, in February 1891 a Colonial Office official named John Bramstone drafted his landmark “Memorandum as to the Jurisdiction and Administrative Powers of a European State holding Protectorates in Africa."(41) This document provided the basis not only for colonial rule in Bechuanaland, but was later applied to other African Protectorates such as Uganda and Nyasaland. In his memo Bramstone defined Bechuanaland as:

"An uncivilized territory to which Europeans resort in greater or less numbers, and where, inasmuch as the native rulers of the territory are incapable of maintaining peace, order and good government among Europeans, the protecting Power maintains courts, police and other institutions for the control, safety and benefit of its own subjects and of the natives."

Bramstone further argued that sovereignty in "an uncivilized African territory" could be "exercised by the same methods as if the ruler had ceded his whole country to her Majesty." He based this conclusion on the Foreign Jurisdictions Act under which Botswana had originally been occupied. The Act had been changed to allow the British Government to control its own subjects in "uncivilized" foreign territories. Bramstone concluded that if Britain was allowed to protect its citizens in Protectorates, then it had the right as a "civilized power" to place its own courts and government officers in an "uncivilized territory." Britain's right to rule Botswana was thus justified not to protect Batswana from the Boers or any other whites but rather to protect all whites from Batswana.

On the basis of the Bramstone Memorandum a second, May 1891, Order-in-Council was issued. It authorized the High Commissioner to enact laws for: "the administration of justice, the raising of revenue and generally for peace, order and good government of all persons within this order including the prohibition of acts tending to disturb the public peace."(42) To assure that Batswana accepted the new colonial order Shippard expanded his paramilitary police. A BBP unit, the "K troop", was stationed at Gaborone to watch over the southern Dikgosi.

Khama and the founding of Rhodesia

Only one Kgosi had been formally notified of the BSACo's Royal Charter. On 16 December 1889 Shippard wrote to Khama:

"The British South Africa Company has received from Her Majesty most extensive powers not only over the whole Bechuanaland Protectorate, but up to the Chobe and Zambesi Rivers and far beyond.... The powers of the Company include all mercantile operations, digging for precious stones and minerals, the raising, equipment, and maintenance of armed forces for preserving order and protecting the territories included in the Company's Charter, and many other rights and privileges. The Company will not interfere in any way with your rights and powers in the Government of your country and people, and Mr. Rhodes hopes to have your support and assistance in his great work of carrying the blessings of civilization not only into Matabeleland and Mashonaland [Zimbabwe], but, in due time and with God's blessing, throughout the interior of Africa."(43)

In his 1 January 1890 reply to Shippard Khama stated that:

"I trust I may always be found ready to give all the help in my power to open the interior to the blessings of God's Book, and all the blessings which the English people have brought to me and my people, and to help the English Government in every way in which I gave my promise to you at Kopong to be ready to do."(44)

Khama's letter to Rhodes of the same date went further by specifically offering soldiers in a war against the Amandebele.(45) Consciously or not, Khama had already assisted Rhodes by detaining a number of Bulawayo bound individuals who opposed BSACo interests. This led to an international incident in July 1888 when his men attacked a party of Boers leading to the death of Piet Grobler, the Transvaal's envoy to Amandebele.(46) Khama had also urged the Balozi and Batonga to follow his example by signing agreements with Rhodes' agents.(47) These agreements then became the basis of BSACo rule over Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

From 1890 Khama's capital at Palapye served as a forward base for BSACo expansion into central Africa. The Bangwato, themselves, assisted in the 1890 invasion Vashona territory by the Company's Pioneer Column. (48) In the years that followed Khama prospered, while providing support for BSACo operations. In 1893 he supplied 1760 troops, (more than the 1,000 requested of him) to join 815 BBP and 1230 BSACo troopers in crushing the Amandebele. (49) This conflict had been provoked by BSACo in order to seize more Amandebele territory. In an effort to avoid a fight he knew he would lose, Lobengula sent two groups of messengers to beg for peace from the High Commissioner. His appeal never reached its destination as members of both groups were killed by BBP. After months of fighting the Amandebele kingdom was destroyed. A new settler colony was established, soon to be known as "Southern Rhodesia".

Sebele resists Colonial Rule

By March 1892, southern Botswana was on the brink of war. The BBP K troop was being reinforced at Gaborone in preparation for a possible assault on Molepolole. The region had been drifting towards crisis since the May 1891 Order-in-Council. In October 1891 Shippard used the new authority to impose license fees on the Protectorate's traders.(50) When the southern dikgosi questioned this decree, they were told that they had no say in the matter.(51) Despite this rebuke, Sebele decided to forbid Asian and Boer merchants operating in Kweneng from paying the fees.

In February 1892 Shippard's new Deputy Commissioner for the Southern Protectorate, William Surmon, tried to force the Kweneng traders to pay their fees. Surmon's post had also been created in October 1891 "with the view of keeping in check the somewhat turbulent Chiefs Linchwe and Sebele."(52) When his police tried to close an Asian shop for non-payment, Sebele had it reopened. Then two policemen tried to collect payment from a Boer trader but were stopped by a Bakwena mob. Sebele informed the two that "he refused to allow anyone trading on his ground to pay any license whatever; he was the man to whom licenses had to be paid, not the English Government". Shippard then called for tough action:

"I am of the opinion that the matter is too serious to be safely treated as a mere case of obstructing the police in the performance of their duties...It appears to me beyond doubt that this case is regarded by the other Chiefs, and the natives generally in the Southern Protectorate, as a test, and that any further attempt to collect licenses, or exact payment of fine, will be resisted. I should deprecate any threats or demands which we might not be prepared immediately to enforce....Towards this end I think the first step should be to come to an understanding with Khama, and obtain from him his promise of assistance in the event of trouble arising in the Southern Protectorate. In any case, and whether annexation be decided on or not, it appears to me to be necessary to make immediate preparations for coercive measures."(53)

Soon the High Commissioner authorized preparations for a joint assault on Molepolole by the police and Bangwato. He was afraid, though, that the Bakgatla, Bangwaketse and Batlokwa would join the Bakwena if fighting broke out. The Bakwena, themselves, decided only to fight if first fired on. Sebele therefore decided to back down by donating ten cattle to Surmon as a sign of his "friendship." He added:

"My ancestors kept their villages in good order without acting under the compulsion of others. Friendship does not mean giving laws to another. Friendship is to advise each other."(54)

To Shippard's frustration his Colonial Office superiors welcomed this development. They instructed Shippard through the High Commissioner that he could impose fees only "with the consent of the Chiefs."

The Concessions Commission and Bakaa Crisis

The peaceful resolution of the crisis over the imposition of trading licenses did not resolve the larger issue of BSACo rights within Botswana. In August 1892 A.A. Baumann, a British MP with interests in Sebele's "Secheleland Concession", wrote to the Colonial Office protesting continued efforts to have non-BSACo concessions cancelled.(54) In reply he was informed that the Government had decided to form a Commission of Enquiry to look into the whole question of concessions.)

The 1893 Concessions Commission was not an impartial body. Its task was to disallow those concessions which clashed with BSACo interests. Still insisting that he, not Queen Victoria, had the authority to decide such matters, Sebele through his lawyer refused to recognize the Commission's authority.(55) Echoing him were lawyers for the rival concessions who maintained the BSACo had acquired no rights in Botswana. Thus, when the Commission issued its report,

its legitimacy had already been undermined. Recognizing this, the Colonial Office delayed so as to give the BSACo time to reach private agreements with the dikgosi and/or rival concessionaires.

In February 1894 Shippard tried once more to provoke a war against the southern Dikgosi. Earlier the Bakaa, who had been living with the Bakwena since 1849, had broken up into two factions following the death of their Kgosi Mosinyi. This split led to disputes over cattle. With the assistance of Bathoen and other neighbouring dikgosi, Sebele awarded the royal cattle to one of the claimants, Segotso. But this was rejected by Shippard, who backed the rival claims of Khama's son-in-law Tshwene. Shippard recommended that Khama be allowed to impose a settlement; Surmon was then appointed to hold an enquiry with the assistance of Khama's secretary Ratshosa. (56)

Surmon's proceedings shocked the Bakgatla, Bangwaketse, Bakwena and others who came to witness the proceedings. He simply gave all the cattle to Tshwene, without specifying how many he was owed. When 196 were delivered, Surmon called for another 200. Sebele then decided to oppose the judgment.

Shippard tried to use Sebele's supposed refusal to obey Surmon as a basis for his deposition. (57) New plans were made to burn down Molepolole. In addition to Bangwato, Shippard hoped to get Balete support by promising them Bangwaketse territory. He planned to finance the operation by the seizure and sale of Bakwena cattle. Even after Sebele agreed to submit to Surmon's new demands, Shippard proceeded with his scheme. (58)

Fortunately, the High Commissioner intervened and ordered the police to stand down. Shippard then tried to create a new crisis the following month by reporting that Linchwe and Sebele were preparing to join the Amandebele in a new uprising. This effort failed to impress Shippard's superiors, though.

Bathoen, Khama, and Sebele go to Britain

It is doubtful whether Khama would have joined Shippard in warring on his fellow Batswana in 1894. By then he was beginning to understand that Rhodes was a threat to his own position. With Southern Rhodesia secure, the final transfer of the Protectorate to the BSACo seemed imminent. The loss by the Amandebele of most of their land to white settlers after the 1893 war was a warning. Moreover, Rhodes showed no gratitude to Khama for the Bangwato support he had received. Meanwhile Khama's own position was being challenged by two junior brothers, Raditladi and Mphoeng, who were rumoured to have Chartered Company support.

By 1895 Rhodes was at the height of his power, being the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony as well as master of the Rhodesias. For him direct control of Bechuanaland was now a stepping stone to the realization of his greater ambition- to seize the gold rich Transvaal.

In July 1895 the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, and Bangwato all sent petitions to London against BSACo rule. (59) Bathoen, Khama, and Sebele then decided to take their case directly to the British government and people. Between September and November 1895, the three travelled throughout Britain, speaking out against the BSACo threat in forty different towns and cities.

Working with the L.M.S., which was celebrating its 100th anniversary, their whirlwind tour of Britain was a public relations triumph. They presented themselves to the British public as model Christian rulers. At the time missionary influence over British public opinion was especially strong.

The dikgosi also won support of prohibitionist by accusing BSACo of promoting the liquor trade: "We fear that they will fill our country with liquor shops, as they have Bulawayo and some parts of Mashonaland and Matabeleland."(60) To Rhodes' frustration Bathoen and Sebele joined Khama in giving up alcohol themselves.

The dikgosi's campaign also attracted support from some imperialists like Warren, now London Police Commissioner, who believed that Colonial Office, not a private company, should hold administrative authority. Others who were sceptical of imperialism saw Rhodes as a personification of colonial exploitation and corruption at its worst. These people sympathy with the dikgosi's more fundamental fears:

"You can really see now that what they [BSACo] really want is not to govern nicely, but to take our land and sell it that they might see gain... the Company have conquered the Matabele, and taken the land of the people they conquered. We know the custom: but we have not yet heard that it is the custom of any people to take the best lands of their friends...Where will our cattle stay if the waters are taken from us? They will die. The Company wants to impoverish us so that hunger may drive us to become the white man's servants who dig in his mines and gather his wealth."(61)

By November 6, 1895 the dikgosi had emerged as a threat to Rhodes' timetable for attacking the Transvaal from Bechuanaland. The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, therefore that Gangwaketse, Gammangwato and Kweneng would remain under imperial control. The rest of the Protectorate, though, could be given over to the BSACo.

After a formal, symbolically important, audience with Queen Victoria, as well as substantial sessions with Chamberlain, the dikgosi left Britain believing that their own territories were secure from Rhodes. But, even this assumption about their ability to preserve "a half a loaf" was naive. (62) It was soon suggested that BSACo could get the rest of the Protectorate in a future settlement. (63) Meanwhile the Balete, Bakgatla, and Barolong were transferred "as instalments of a general settlement with the B.S.A. Company with regard to the Bechuanaland Protectorate."(64) By then the Colonial Secretary had already opened the door to the destruction of Bathoen and Sebele's through BBP Colonel Hamilton Goold-Adams.

Goold-Adams had already distinguished himself in his service of Rhodes-ian interests when he was appointed to demarcate the Bakwena and Bangwaketse boundaries in order to ensure that they were left with nothing more than small, uneconomic locations. As a guideline it was agreed that the two merafe would only be allocated villages and farm plots permanently occupied by "proper" Bakwena and Bangwaketse. Most of their cattle posts, pasture and hunting grounds were to become Crown Lands. This theft was to be justified by a newfound (and quite temporary) Colonial Office concern about "the lawfulness of the relations of the Bechuana tribes proper towards the Bakalahari."(65)

Nor were the Bangwato off the hook. Although Khama had seemingly been given a generous reserve, which included Bakalanga lands where his pretensions to rule were debatable, it soon became Chamberlain's desire that part of his reserve be surrendered to BSACo on the pretext of a need to accommodate his local opposition. (66)

The Jameson Raid

Goold-Adams' plan was stopped by the Jameson raid. By 1895 the Chamberlain had given Rhodes the go-ahead to invade the Transvaal, though the British government was not officially involved. This was because the Colonial Office felt that the Transvaal was becoming too independent through the money it received from its booming gold mines. Germany capital and advisors were also very active in the Transvaal, thus threatened Britain's predominance. Kruger's Transvaal government was, furthermore, unsympathetic to British gold mine owners' demands for cheaper transport, black labour and goods.

As with the occupation of the Rhodesias, Bechuanaland was to be the forward base for the invasion of the Transvaal by BSACo mercenaries. The eastern border was the staging ground. Thus, the Gaborone, Lobatse and Tuli Blocks along with the Barolong, Balete and Bakgatla areas were transferred to the BSACo in 1895.

On December 23, 1895, a month after they had left Britain, Bathoen, Khama and Sebele returned home. At Kgore, near the Molopo border a crowd of several thousand gave them a hero's welcome. The dikgosi's mission to Queen Victoria was praised as a diplomatic victory which would stop Rhodes taking over the country. But, with growing a number of troops stationed between Mafikeng and Gaborone it was not clear that they had really succeeded. (67)

In December 1885 an armed force was assembled in south-eastern Bechuanaland by Rhodes' trusted lieutenant Dr. L.S. Jameson. According to newspaper reports its target was Mochudi, where Linchwe was supposed to be eager to resist the imposition of BSACo control. These reports, however, were disinformation planted by Rhodes’s agents in a futile attempt to trick the Boers. When Jameson's men set off from Pitsane Potlhogo on 29 December, 1895, their true destination was Johannesburg.

Jameson's raid was part of a broader plot to overthrow Kruger's government. Jameson was to invade from the Protectorate, while pro-British expatriates in Johannesburg were supposed to lead an uprising there. Despite much secrecy the plan became known to W.J. Leydes, chief of Kruger's secret police. The expatriate rebellion failed after most of its leaders were arrested. Meanwhile Jameson's men were surrounded near Krugersdorp, where they surrendered on 2 January, 1896.

The failed Jameson Raid was an international scandal. Rhodes' political influence in Britain and southern Africa was reduced. Within the Protectorate direct imperial rule was restored and Goold-Adams's proposed boundaries were subsequently rejected. Thus, due to good luck, Bathoen, Khama and Sebele were able to defeat Rhodes after all. After the fall of Rhodes, the dikgosi's mission to the Britain was now seen by Batswana as a heroic success. Over the years a story grew

that "Mmamosadinyana", the Queen, had listened to the dikgosi and stopped Rhodes from taking the Protectorate.

If Rhodes had taken the Transvaal, it is likely that all of the Batswana would have lived under his government. As it was the BSACo still kept its economic interests in Botswana after 1896. The company owned the railway, and the Gaborone, Ghanzi, Lobatse and Tuli Blocks, as well as mineral and other rights over most of the Protectorate.

ECOLOGICAL CRISIS AND WAR

During the last half decade of the nineteenth century Botswana was plagued by the worst series of natural disasters in its modern history. In the wake of years of drought, locust infestation, and an array of human epidemics up to 20% of the Protectorates' population may have perished along with most of its livestock and much of its remaining wildlife. Local livelihoods were also affected by such parallel developments as the imposition of Hut Tax, the 1899-1902 South African War, and the completion of the Mafikeng to Bulawayo railroad. A significant long-term outcome of all of the tribulations and developments was a sharp expansion in the flow of migrant labour out of the Protectorate. While the absence of comprehensive data makes it impossible to fully quantify the extent of this migration before the 1940s, a variety of sources indicates that by 1910 most of Botswana had already become a peripheral, increasingly underdeveloped labour reserve within the southern African macro-economy.(68)

During this period those dikgosi who enjoyed the status of imperial recognition as gazetted chiefs began to occupy an intermediary political position between the colonial state and their own subjects. Yet despite the growing economic marginalization of their communities many dikgosi were able to maintain a significant degree of autonomy for themselves and their polities.

Ecological Crisis

The disastrous nature of the 1890s ecological crisis was not immediately apparent. In historic times Botswana has always been a semi-arid country prone to drought. Droughts were recorded in every decade during the nineteenth century, with the worst ones being in 1845-51, 1856-62, and 1876-9, as well as 1896-99. Batswana had thus evolved ways of coping without crops. Locust swarms were less common, having not been seen in the region for many decades before they began appear around 1890. At first, however, they were merely a nuisance, and indeed provided people with variety to their diet. But, as the 1890s wore on the swarms kept getting bigger and spread all over the country. When the rains failed in 1895 there was no great problem as grain had been stored.

But nothing in the experiences of the most white-haired Batswana could have prepared them for the 1896 arrival of rinderpest, or bolwane as the scourge was locally known. Within months it was officially estimated that 90% of the territory's cattle had perished. (69) Sebele's herd of some 10,000 was reportedly reduced to just 77 beasts. (70) Other dikgosi as well as commoners similarly suffered. In May 1896 a traveller wrote:

"Hundreds of dead oxen laying in every stage of decomposition, behind the bushes- in places a dozen a batch! The whole air was vitiated by the stench of them, and amidst them we had to camp! I observed that the natives were busily skinning all the dead beasts, and apparently making biltong of the flesh...I don't see how this country can escape a famine now- their crops have all failed from drought, and the remnants are eaten by locusts; their cattle are nearly all dead! I suppose a score of live cattle where there should have been a thousand or two! Khama alone is said to have lost 70,000 or 90,000 head."(71)

By 1897 the Bechuanaland Annual Report noted that:

"All of the tribes, except perhaps Linchwe's, are at present very short of food, and many have not the means of purchasing sufficient food for their families. They are, however, making an effort to obtain money for the purpose of buying food by going out to work in Kimberley, Jagersfontein, Johannesburg, and other places."(72)

As the effects of the crisis spread many missionaries, as well as colonial officials saw the destruction of cattle as a positive development. For example, Rev. Howard Williams in his 1896 annual report:

"The loss of their cattle has driven large numbers to seek work. Certainly, the best thing that could happen as far a teaching them the value of labour...Work was the last thing thought of except among the poorer classes and with these the period rarely exceeds 6 months. All that is altered. A generation will pass before this country will recover its lost wealth in cattle."(73)

Such Christian indifference was, however, overwhelmed as the crisis deepened. Throughout 1897 and 1898 missionary reports consistently speak of horrific mortality rates brought on by famine and fever. When the same Williams visited Kolobeng in June 1898, where several thousand Bakwena of the Kgari faction had been staying he was shocked to find the place nearly deserted. The local kgosi, Baanami told him that his followers were either "in graves or scattered in all directions seeking food or work."(74)

Williams supports this observation by supplying statistics for four of the community's makgotla showing recent death to former membership ratios of 57/150, 21/70, 11/14 and 14/40. He further noted that 15 out of 34 church members had died at Kumakwane, along with nearly all members of its once predominant Griqua community and one fifth of the Batlokwa. In Kanye an estimated 1,500 perished in 1898, while over a third of all students at the L.M.S. school in Molepolole died in 1898. (75)

As bad became worse the Protectorate's Annual report for 1897/98 noted that the territory "flooded by both white and coloured persons calling themselves Labour Agents."(76) While no complete set of numbers exists for calculating the total size of the exodus of migrant labour, official statements as well as missionary impressions, support the contention that it was of considerable magnitude. The 1897/98 report observed that: "So many men have gone that most villages present a quite deserted appearance."

Other means of coping with famine

Throughout the ecological crisis Batswana looked for ways to survive besides labour migration. There traditional option of dispersing into smaller bands to rely on hunting and gathering was compromised by the devastation caused by rinderpest on wildlife populations. The epizootic afflicted all hoofed mammals. Initially most dikgosi tried to fulfil popular expectations by catering for the needy with their communal grain stores. As a result, Bathoen, Khama and Sebele initially rejected aid offered through a Bechuanaland Relief Committee, which was sponsored by official and missionary elements. Sebele:

"The offer has come through the wrong channels. The very fact that the Government officials have written to the missionaries for information has caused my people to look upon the offer with suspicion. The government in some of their dealings with my people have not been true to their word."(77)

This posture was soon overwhelmed by desperate circumstance. The dikgosi relented and sent wagons regularly to pick up relief supplies. By December 1898 over 1,400 women and children in Molepolole were receiving rations from the Committee. (78) Khama, however, refused to take free food, insisting that Bangwato pay the wholesale cost of the food.

During 1897 many Bangwato and other Batswana were able to get local jobs constructing the BSACo railway line from Mafikeng to Bulawayo. But, by the end of the year the project was largely finished. This also had an adverse effect on those Batswana who worked as transport riders along the route. For many years transport riding had been a lucrative source of income for those able to invest in an ox-wagon.

A new way was, however, found in which to raise some money. After the construction of the railway, it became possible to send wood to Kimberley very easily on the train. Batswana living close to the railway began cutting down trees and selling off the timber, usually with the permission of their kgosi who was given some of the profit. But, by 1910, practically all of the area along the railway had been deforested. (79)

In Ngamiland there was neither the railway nor free food distribution, while migrant labour jobs were even further away. The Batawana Kgosi Sekgoma Letsholathebe was forced to take drastic measures. He stemmed the spread of rinderpest in certain areas by restricting travel. He exercised control over the distribution of existing food to alleviate famine. Orphaned children were sent out to places where cattle still existed. (80)

The introduction of Hut Tax

If food for work was the carrot designed to lure Batswana into dependence on wage labour the colonial state's imposition of Hut Tax was the stick. As one official observed at the time of its introduction: "it has a twofold advantage, it drives young men to work and it raises revenue."(81)

Bathoen, Khama and Sebele had, as a concession designed to preserve direct imperial control, agreed in principle to taxation during their 1895 negotiations with the Colonial Office. By the

time of its actual imposition, in April 1899, most Batswana were still being pushed into migrancy by drought and the collapse of the herds and game. When the tax was announced Bathoen reportedly protested that:

"Owing to famine not many people were left in his country; that most had gone to work or look for food, that this was the fourth year in succession that their crops had failed; that he was almost alone in the village; that the young men had gone out to the mines and were now living there."(82)

As the ecology of the Protectorate began to slowly recover after 1899 the increasingly rigorous enforcement of Hut Tax payments became an important factor in assuring a steady flow of migrant workers. Of the 335 criminal cases prosecuted by the Molepolole magistrate between 1921 and 1925, 262 concerned failure to pay Hut Tax. (83) Usually, the colonial state was able to rely on the dikgosi to assure collection. By the 1920s many rulers were ordering all able-bodied men who failed to pay their tax to sign contracts with local labour recruiters. Thus, in 1924 out of the L 3725 in Hut Tax receipts paid in Molepolole, L 1768 was directly remitted by labour recruiters as cash advances on 861 new contracts. (84)

Those gazetted as chiefs had potential motives other than colonial pressure to see that taxes were collected. From 1899 they were allowed to annually pocket up to 10% of all the Hut Tax money in their reserves. Most also imposed special levies and expected gifts from returning migrants.(85) Some of this revenue was used for public projects, but probably most before 1938 introduction of Tribal Treasuries was used by dikgosi for personnel consumption.

Langeberg rebellion

Why did Batswana not protest more strongly against the introduction of the Hut Tax. One factor was undoubtedly the effect of the 1897 Langeberg rebellion among the Batlhaping south of the Molopo on local thinking. There all Batswana had seen the consequence of open resistance to Hut Tax. (86)

In the former British Bechuanaland region of the Cape Colony, Batlhaping, Batlharo and Barolong had also been severely affected by rinderpest and drought, while living in overcrowded locations. In 1896, when rinderpest was coming through the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the British authorities in the Northern Cape began shooting Batswana cattle, claiming that African cattle were responsible for the diseases spread. When rinderpest arrived, the British kept shooting many Batswana cattle.

In 1897, just when rinderpest and famine were at their worst, the Cape authorities imposed their own Hut Tax on the southern Batswana. Many Batlhaping, led by dikgosi Luka Jantjie Galeshwe, and then rebelled. After some initial encounters most of the rebels retreated into the Langeberg Hills, where they were they withstood a five-month siege. But, after the death of over 1,500 defenders, the Batlhaping were defeated. Their surviving leaders were imprisoned or executed. About 4,000 other captured Batlhaping, mostly women and children sent to the Western Cape, where they were forced to work like slaves for white farmers.

Batswana in the Protectorate knew all about what the British were doing down south. In his kgotla Bathoen called Luka a hero, saying "they have killed him, but they did so after he had fought."(87) Then turning to a Mosotho policeman named Masilo he asked: "How do the white men fight?" The Sergeant replied "When the government fights no one gets the best against it; the Government always wins." Writing of the "white atrocities" the Rev. Williams concluded that among his Bakwena flock: "The name of the white man must stink as from the bottom of the pit."(88)

Batswana and the South African War, 1899-1902

In 1899 ecological crisis was immediately followed by the outbreak of the South African or second Anglo-Boer War. The latter is a misnomer in that non-white communities throughout southern Africa also participated in the conflict. At first British and Boers tried to keep Africans out of the fighting. They said they were fighting a "White Man's War". Both sides feared armed blacks more than each other. But, blacks, including Batswana, became involved. (89)

When the war broke out the Protectorate's merafe all remained loyal to the British. Thereafter the Boers decided to try and take Palapye and Gaborone in an effort to cut rail communication between the Cape Colony and Rhodesias. In the north Khama's men were mobilized rapidly, before and Rhodesia based British troops could arrive to reinforce the position. Due to this quick response, the Boers backed off and no fighting took place in the Gammangwato.

In the south, the Boer Commandant Peter "Ramolora" Swartz reached an agreement with Sebele in February 1900 to keep his men east of the railway.(90) When the Boers threatened to renege on this agreement the Bakwena and Bangwaketse mobilized their mephato, but fighting was avoided. Along with the Barolong, individual Bakwena and Bangwaketse were active in running supplies across enemy lines to the besieged town of Mafikeng.

The Bakgatla bagaKgafela role in the war was greater. At the outset of the fighting, the British feared the Bakgatla might join the war on the Boer side. But, Linchwe saw no purpose in allying his people with those who had forced them to flee to Mochudi three decades earlier. Soon after the war began, Boer soldiers began to raid Bakgatla cattle posts. They also set up a military camp on the eastern border of Kgatleng at Derdepoort. (91)

When the British approached Linchwe to help them fight the Boers at Derdepoort, he agreed. Expecting to do all the fighting themselves, the British recruited the Bakgatla to guide and support them. Three Bakgatla age regiments joined a small British force that was armed with a Maxim gun. The attack began at dawn 25 November 1899 with the British firing on the Boer camp. The Bakgatla joined the shooting, only to be abandoned by their allies. They, nonetheless, kept up the fight. Without help from their supposed protectors they won a clear victory, killing 20 Boers and taking many prisoners. The British had Colonel Holsworth had lost his nerve.

After his victory at Deerdeport Linchwe fought the rest of the war against the Boers without paying much attention to the British. Fighting continued in the Derdepoort area. In December, the Boers burned down Sikwane. Linchwe responded by sending his men into the Transvaal, where they intercepted Boer supplies bound for Derdepoort. As a result, the Boers were forced to pull out. In the months that followed, Bakgatla carried out large cattle-raiding expeditions in

the Transvaal, capturing at least 10,000 animals. They were thus able to rebuild their herds from the effects of rinderpest.

By 1901 Linchwe's men controlled most of the countryside between Kgatleng and Rustenburg. Much of this land had been held by Bakgatla before the Boers arrived in the 1840s. Once the war was over, Linchwe asked the British for the rights over his re-conquered territory. (92) This was refused. Post-war British policy treated the defeated Boers as partners in the creation of a new, white ruled, South Africa. It was the blacks who had supported the British who were treated like the enemy. Politically they became worse off than before the war.

THE PROTECTORATE DEFINED.

In the aftermath of the South African War, two developments helped to define how politics in the Bechuanaland Protectorate would be exercised in the future. First, there was a landmark court case brought against the colonial government by Batawana Kgosi Sekgoma Letsholathebe. The government won the case, which confirmed that its officials were literally above the law when carrying out instructions from the High Commissioner.

Second, the British government from 1907 began to press for the Protectorates transfer to the control of the nascent Union of South Africa. It wanted to save money and also to put blacks under the control of local whites. Batswana leaders joined together to oppose this transfer to South Africa. The idea emerged that the peoples of Bechuanaland belonged to a common nation, which should not be located within another country.

As in 1895 the Batswana leaders who opposed the transfer of the Protectorate to South Africa used an idea taken from the British themselves. When they established the Protectorate, the British claimed to be "protecting" Batswana. They therefore once more appealed to the British public not to betray them by handing them over to the Boers.

The Sekgoma Letsholathebe Case

The first Motswana to legally challenge the authority of the colonial state in its courts was the Batawana ruler Sekgoma Letsholathebe. Between 1906 and 1912 he was detained without trial by the British at Gaborone. Sekgoma's lawyers argued that this violated his rights under English law to either be tried or released. Unfortunately for him and other Batswana who followed in his footsteps, the courts ultimately ruled that as a British Protected Person, rather than a subject, Sekgoma had no legal standing. The absolute authority of the High Commissioner, acting on behalf of the British Crown, was thus upheld. (93)

Sekgoma's detention was rooted in disputes over bogosi. He came to power in 1891 as a regent (motswareledi-kgosi) for his then three-year-old nephew. But once in power he tried to cultivate a large group of supporters who would help him claim bogosi in his own right. Sekgoma's ambition was consistently opposed by most members of the royal family who looked forward to the succession of Mathiba.

In 1905 with Sekgoma temporarily out of the way in South Africa, a group of leading royals summoned the now seventeen-year-old Mathiba from school in Cape Town to have him installed. They also sent letters to Khama, whom Sekgoma had already alienated, asking him to convince the government that Sekgoma was not the real chief. This plan worked out, and Mathiba was soon on the train heading back to Ngamiland. Sekgoma heard about the conspiracy. He also got on the train in order to get home quickly. Then British government got involved because it did not want fighting to break out between the supporters of the two men.

Before they could reach Ngamiland both Sekgoma and Mathiba were detained by the British. The government then decided to send a delegation to investigate who should be the Batawana Kgosi. In 1906 the Resident Commissioner, Ralph Williams, went to Ngamiland and after consulting the Batawana, declared for Mathiba chief. Mathiba, he said, was legitimate by birth and had the support of the majority. Despite his claims of impartiality, it is clear that Williams, influenced at least in part by Khama, had made up his mind before his arrival.

Mathiba was installed as Kgosi in late 1906, but Sekgoma remained in detention at Gaborone gaol. The Resident Commissioner justified this with the assumption that if set free Sekgoma would cause a disturbance in Ngamiland. He still claimed to be Kgosi. In British law such detention without trial violates the habeas corpus principal, which holds that a person cannot be held indefinitely without being charged and convicted of a crime. Sekgoma was detained on the basis of crimes he might commit.

Sekgoma refused to accept his circumstance and began to legally challenge his detention. The High Commissioner then sought to retroactively justify the detention by issuing the "Expulsion Law"- Proclamation no. 15 of 1907, which gave the colonial state the right to either detain or remove individuals from all or a part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate who constituted "a danger to peace, order and good government."(94) Extrajudicial authority for this law was based on the sweeping powers bestowed on the High Commissioner by the 1891 Order-in-Council.

Despite the Proclamation Sekgoma, encouraged by his friend Charles Riley, a Coloured trader, decided to press his demand for habeas corpus. After failing to obtain habeas corpus in the Cape, in 1909 Sekgoma sent Riley and two other friends to London. There they hired a British lawyer to take the case as far as the Privy Council, the highest judicial body of the British Empire. But the Council ultimately denied Sekgoma legal standing arguing that as a Protected Person he was a foreign subject not entitled to British legal protection.

Bramstone's rationalization of the 1891 Order-in-Council was implicitly upheld. While expressing some discomfort at denying people under British rule in the Protectorate the legal safeguards enjoyed by themselves the British judges noted that their misgivings were: "made less difficult if one remembers that the Protectorate is a country in which a few dominant civilized men have to control a great multitude of the semi-barbarous."(95) Thus legal protections like habeas corpus could be "ruinous when applied to semi-savage tribes."

And so, the literate Sekgoma, who typed his own letters and was married and divorced according to British law, was denied basic human rights due to his "semi-barbarous" nature. Likewise, the "uncivilized" status of all other blacks within the Protectorate was confirmed. Before 1966 many

others, including such figures as dikgosi Sebele II, Nswazwi VIII, Tshekedi, Gobuamang, Molefi and Seretse Khama would become victims of the 1907 Expulsion Law.

Back in Ngamiland Sekgoma continued to enjoy a large following. In 1908 the "Special Commissioner" for Ngamiland, Jules Ellenberger, had pro-Sekgoma "ringleaders" arrested. When "a mob of 150 men" tried to release the men, they were forcibly disarmed by the police and Mathiba's men. For good measure Ellenberger fired off a maxim gun, which he later claimed had: "a most excellent effect on the mind of any who might still have felt inclined to oppose Mathiba".(96)

An ailing Sekgoma was finally allowed to settle at Chobe in 1912. There he was joined by about half of Ngamiland's population. He died there in 1914, and most of his followers thereafter drifted back to Ngamiland.

The 1908-10 Campaign against incorporation into South Africa

The history of nationalism in Botswana, along with the other former High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Lesotho and Swaziland, is fundamentally different from most African countries. At least until the last decade of colonial era nationalist sentiment was equated with the retention, rather than rejection, of the British occupation. This was because there long existed a consensus among local Batswana that British overrule as a Protectorate preserved nascent Botswana from incorporation into the white settler dominated states of South Africa and/or Southern Rhodesia. Thus, for many decades, nationalist minded Batswana were stronger advocates of imperial control than the imperialists themselves. In this context the seminal twentieth century event in the emergence of modern Botswana nationalism was the 1908-1910 campaign to keep the then Bechuanaland Protectorate (BP) out of the proposed Union of South Africa.

The First Petitions

The possibility of the BP's inclusion in a future Union of South Africa became apparent with the July 1907 publication of Selborne's 7 January 1907 Memorandum to the Colonial Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, whose object had been "to review the general situation in south Africa in such a manner as may enable the people of this country to appreciate the difficulties of administration under the present system, and consider whether (and if so by what means) it is advisable to establish a central national government embracing all the British Colonies and Protectorates." Selborne's call was fully taken up in May 1908 when representatives at an Inter-colonial Railway and Customs Conference [of British southern Africa] called for the convening of a National Convention made up of delegates appointed by the parliaments of the four self-governing white settler colonies [Cape Colony, Natal, Orange River Sovereignty and Transvaal] in order to draft a for a "Closer Union or Federation of South Africa."(97)

On 23 May 1908 Bakwena Kgosi Sebele I forwarded the first in a series of petitions expressing his subject’s objection to becoming part of such a Union:

"That in the event of the coming Federation or Unification becoming a reality, we should like to see our rights reserved and protected under the Imperial Government.

"That in the event of the coming of Federation or Unification is going to rob us of all our present rights or interests in so far as our land is concerned, we are not going to federate.

"I am the inheritance left by the late Queen Victoria the Good, under his majesty the King Edward VII. I do not want any government except Imperial Government.

"Will the coming Federation be an Imperial Government? We are not going to federate unless assured by His Excellency the high Commissioner that our interests will be safeguarded"(98)

In forwarding his petition Sebele was influenced by his Secretary Peter M.J. Sidzumo. The son of "a well-known Mfengu preacher" who had settled in Mafikeng, Peter Sidzumo is one of the great unsung heroes of Botswana for the leading role he subsequently played in mobilizing and coordinating Batswana opinion against the South African threat. (99)

While Sebele was the first kgosi to call for the retention of Imperial control, his petition was preceded by 12 May 1908 letter from the Basotho Khosi Letsie II, which asked: "Are we of Basutoland thought of in this unification?"(100) Following these separate initiatives Letsie and Sebele, with the able assistance of their respective secretaries, Phillip Modise and Sidzumo, worked together. In a 30 May 1908 letter to Letsie, Sebele expressed his eagerness to maintain close contact and further enquired about the workings of the Basotho National Council. (101)

Through Sidzumo's pen Sebele also associated himself with the then rising current of black protest politics within South Africa, which was finding its voice through a vibrant African controlled press, regional "Native" Congresses and political associations, as well as such forums as the Inter-State Native College Scheme that founded Fort Hare University. In a published address, given in absentia, to the latter body's July 1908 Convention, entitled "Why South Africa Fails" Sebele noted:

"But then who is really to blame that 'the Kafirs has thus commenced to read from the wrong end of the book'. It is a very common fallacy frequently hinted at by white witnesses that a good deal of the blame for the existing unsatisfactory state of affairs rests on the shoulders of the missionaries. Surely not the missionaries so much as the colonists who became unduly alarmed at the prospect of natives becoming skilled workmen and competing with local white workmen. Is it not the fault of the white population entirely that the opening of a technical institution for the natives has been delayed till a few months ago in that colony [Natal]? What advances have the colonists made generally in regard to the Native Problem? Is it really true that a French Committee has drafted a bill under the instructions of the Minister of Education for the establishment of an African University at Algiers? Have the French undoubtedly not shown great courage in dealing with this phase of the Education Problem? Is it not a rather startling fact that the Great French Native dependency is represented in the Parliament of Paris by aboriginal and elected deputies!!! Why should South Africa prove so marked an exception?"(102)

The Imperial Response

The appeals of Letsie and Sebele did not go unnoticed. During a June 1908 discussion between Herbert Sloley, Basutoland's Resident Commissioner, and Lord Selborne, the former is recorded to have said that: "In the event of the Basuto becoming seriously dissatisfied and restless, the effect of this would probably be far reaching among the South African tribes."(103) In the same dispatch Selborne further reported to Crewe:

"By this last remark Mr. Sloley did not mean, he explained, that unrest in Basutoland was likely to precipitate that 'General native rising' which to some minds is the object of constant apprehension; he intended rather to convey that their present form of government constituted a certain barrier between the Basuto and surrounding tribes and that any change of government which both weakened that barrier and was resented by the Basuto might tempt them to make common cause with other discontented tribes."

Selborne added "that a proper scheme for the administration of the native territories [HCTs] should be a fundamental part of the [South African] Constitution." The meeting between Sloley and Selborne was immediately preceded by the somewhat belated arrival on the High Commissioners desk of Sebele's petition.(104) This, along with the 28 July petition by Swazi Ndlovukazi(Queen-Regent) Labotsibeni, helped to further convince Selbourne that indigenous opposition to settler rule had to be taken seriously in the other Protectorates as well.(105) It was to facilitate this end that he drafted a set of clauses for an imperially sanctioned "High Commission" to oversee African interests in the territories after their transfer.

Selborne raised the issue of the BP's position in a July 1908 telegram to Crewe.(106) In it he expressed his fear that the territory's weak revenue base would compromise his ambition to keep it, after transfer, free from overbearing control by the South African Parliament. At the time there was also reluctance on the part of the four self-governing settler colonies to assume any financial burden for the BP. In this context he suggested that the factor of residual British South Africa Company claims, along with geography and boundary complications with German South-West Africa could be invoked to justify the temporary exclusion of the Protectorate from the Union, perhaps until such time as southern Rhodesia was also admitted.

Although no firm instructions were given by Crewe at this time, he, specifically citing the Basotho factor, expressed the opinion that it might be advisable to put off the incorporation of all of the Protectorates until after the formation of the Union, while including in its enacting legislation a provision for their possible future absorption that might also address the question of "native consent". (107) The Colonial Office's position was clarified in September-October. In a secret 17 September memorandum, the head of the Dominions Department, Sir Charles Lucas, proposed that they:

"Meet the twin objections that the self-governing Colonies do not want to be burdened with the Protectorates at present, and that we do not want to hand them over at present by going immediately on to provide for the delegation of the administration of the territories to the Governor-General, as the representative of the Imperial Government who shall hold them in trust

on condition that so long as they are in trust His Majesty's government will be financially responsible for them."(108)

There was now a consensus within the Colonial Office that the Protectorates "not be immediately included within the sphere of responsibility of a united South Africa" and that conditions be specified under which their ultimate transfer could be carried out. These conditions, which included the establishment of a High Commission, the non-alienation of tribal land and reservation by the Protectorates of a share of the common Customs duties, were outlined in a secrete October memorandum to Selborne.(109) On 25 October the contents of the memo were informally communicated by Selborne to the National Convention's President, Sir Henry deVilliers.(110)

Opposition to the Union Spreads

In July 1908 Sebele, along with Letsie, received in reply to his petition formal notification of the convening of the National Convention coupled with the assurance that in the event of regional amalgamation his peoples' interests "will receive the constant attention and earnest consideration of the High Commissioner and of His Majesty's Government."(111) In response Sidzumo, on Sebele's behalf, began to rally other merafe (Batswana polities) against the threat. In this effort he found an early ally in Segale Pilane, who then served as the Secretary to his brother Bakgatla Kgosi Linchwe I. In an August 1908 letter to Segale, Sidzumo he cautioned that if the Batswana did not join together to loudly protest against the Union, they "would be killed by their quietness."(112)

The following month Sidzumo also began to lobby the Bangwaketse and Bangwato. In a letter to Bangwaketse Kgosi Bathoen I he noted newspaper stories of the coming of a single government in South Africa that would legislate for blacks as well as whites, adding:

"We have found that the white settlers do not like the black people, neither do they appreciate to see them own land the wealth of which was given to us by God. They only desire to see destruction, hatred, war, and poverty for the black people. Many whites also do not like the powers of our rulers. They destroy the powers of [northern] Basotho and Matabele [Amazulu] rulers because they do not want to be guided by the laws of Natal and the Transvaal but would rather be under the laws of King Edward VII. We are not the nations which have met about the new Union."(113)

With this letter Sidzumo enclosed a draft of Sebele's petition, which was soon reproduced and forwarded by Bathoen. (114) The day after his communication with Bathoen, Sidzumo also wrote to O. Sekgome, Bangwato Kgosi Khama III's Secretary, which stressed the need action in that "the Native Question is the only present obstacle towards the closer union of various South African governments."(115)

While the Bakwena National Office was taking the lead in promoting pan-Batswana unity within the BP another sort of consensus was emerging out of the deliberations of the National Convention. The all-white conference met behind closed doors from October 1908 to February 1909. Its delegates unanimously agreed to a constitution creating a unitary state based on rigid

white supremacy. The limited franchise then enjoyed by non-whites in the Cape Colony was not extended to the other Provinces of the proposed Union. Elective offices at the national level were, furthermore, reserved for those of "European descent." On the question of the Protectorates the initial reluctance on the part of white South African political leaders to embrace Selbourne's concept of a High Commission in which "His Majesty's Government would have a veto on all obviously improper appointments", coupled with their eagerness to consummate the Union of South Africa as soon as possible played into the hands of the Basotho, Batswana and Amaswati. By December 1908 the Convention along with the Colonial Office had accepted that any transfer would have to be delayed until after British Parliamentary approval of the Union of South Africa Act. (116) At the same time the Convention's accepted its Protectorate Committee's twenty-five-point Schedule for their future incorporation, which provided for a High Commission that would have advisory status only and would be free of direct imperial oversight. This Schedule was incorporated into the draft of the Union Act to be submitted to the British Parliament, left the door still open for an early transfer.

The 1909 Petitions

In January 1908 the BP's Acting Resident Commissioner, Barry May, formally notified Batswana of the likelihood of their future inclusion in the nascent South African state. Selborne, citing promises made in his response to Sebele's petition, instructed May to inform the Batswana that while "it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government to sanction any change at present in the system under which the Bechuanaland Protectorate is governed" and the position of the BP was to some degree different from Basutoland and Swaziland due to the existence of British South Africa Company concessions, it was also clear that the Protectorate was "an integral portion of South Africa" and could not "be permanently administered apart from the general political comity of South Africa."(117)

On 5 January, May delivered Selborne's message to the Bangwato, in which he added the words "but it is quite possible, in fact practically certain that the time will come in the future that it will be in the welfare of all concerned that the Imperial government should no longer directly govern the Bechuanaland Protectorate."(118) In a brief speech Khama reportedly replied that this people were quite satisfied with to live under Imperial government and he hoped they would not be handed over to any South African government. May further reported to Selborne that: "I asked Khama if he wished to send a written communication to Your Excellency, but he said 'No,' and that he would be quite satisfied if I informed you of what he said."

The relatively low-key response that greeted May in Serowe stood in sharp contrast with his pitso with the southern Protectorate dikgosi and their followers at Gaberones Camp two days later. The Acting Resident Commissioner reported that he "repeated as nearly as possible what had been said at Serowe."(119) Partial minutes of the meeting, apparently prepared for the dikgosi, do not contain any reference to British South Africa Company interests. (120) Otherwise, they are in general agreement with May's official account of the meeting. Sebele, as the senior BP Kgosi, was the first to reply to May, stating:

"I hear what you have said. When the three Chiefs went to England, we feared the rule of the Chartered Company. We went because we did not want a new Government. Then too we were

afraid both of the Transvaal and Cape Government. We wished to be under the direct control of the Imperial Government. I am under the King- King Edward. True, we may appear useless people; nevertheless, we have no desire to change. We are thankful for the protection we enjoy today. To be handed over- no. We wish to rule our people as heretofore. We decide our disputes according to our customs. When a man is born under one Government how can he be happy under another? If we go, we go simply as a result of compulsion but our hearts we leave behind...."(121)

Sebele was followed by Bathoen, of whose address May reported:

"He created quite a dramatic little scene. He held out his hand in order that all might see a signet ring, engraved with a crocodile, the totem of the Bangwaketsi, and declared 'A ring is a sign of an indissoluble bond. This ring was given to me by the late Queen Victoria...as a proof that the promises made would never be broken and that the Bangwaketsi would forever remain under the protection of Her Majesty.' Then turning to Sebele he called upon him to produce his sign, which the latter immediately did by raising his hand, on which all could see a similar ring."(122)

Bathoen was followed by Linchwe, Baitlotle of the Balete, and "many" others, including non-royals, all of whom were unanimous in their firm opposition to the transfer.

Unlike Khama the southern dikgosi proved eager to forward petitions of their desire to prevent any change in British sovereignty over them. A second Bakwena petition to the High Commissioner, drafted the day after the meeting, was followed by similar efforts on behalf of the Bakgatla, Balete and Bangwaketse. (123) The Bakwena and Bangwaketse appeals were particularly notable for both there lawyerly arguments with regard to their alleged 1895 "contract" with Queen Victoria, and their condemnations of discriminatory practices within the settler colonies. The petitions were forwarded to London in February 1909, where their appearance conveniently coincided with the arrival of a Basotho deputation bearing two petitions from Letsie to King Edward on the subjects of the Union and the "Expulsion Laws".

The Gerrans' Mission

The Batswana struggle to remain outside of South Africa entered a new phase during February-March 1909, when Bathoen and Sebele recruited J. Gerrans of Mafikeng to represent the "chiefs and people" of the BP while in London.(124) In an effort to strengthen their position Sebele wrote Khama in April, referring to their 1895 partnership and warning him of the need to take more active measures.(125) This coincided with reports by the Serowe Resident Magistrate that the Kgosi was becoming increasingly disturbed by the implications of the Union.(126) But, Khama was subsequently reassured by the Resident Commissioner's confirmation of previous assurances and did not become involved in Gerran's efforts.

Before leaving for the U.K. Gerrans contacted W.P. Schreiner, liberal former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and thereafter became a full member of his "Coloured and Native People's Delegation."(127) Schriener had been approached to lead this delegation by Letsie.(128) The Delegation's twin aims were to convince the British Parliament to withhold its approval of the proposed Union of South Africa Act unless it was (a) amended to include a non-racial franchise and (b) prevent the involuntary incorporation of the Protectorates.

In addition to Gerrans and Schriener, its two white members, the Delegation united for the first-time prominent non-whites from across South Africa. Its other members were: Walter Rubusana, Daneil Dwanya, and Thomas Mapikela of the South African Native Convention, John Tengo Jabavu of the Cape Native Convention, Pixley Seme and Alfred Mangena of the Transvaal Native Congress, and Abdul Abdrurahman, D.J. Lenders, and Matthew Fredericks of the, predominately Coloured, African Peoples Organization. Natal activist, John Dube, and three Natal/Transvaal Indian Congress representatives, M.C. Anglia, Mahandas Gandhi, and Haji Habib, travelled separately but worked with the Delegation upon their arrival in London, as did Ismail Abdurahman, D.D.T. Jabavu and Richard Msimang, who were then studying in Britain.

While Bathoen and Sebele allowed Gerrans to join the Delegation they, along with the other traditional rulers of the Protectorates turned down invitations to attend the March 1909 inaugural meeting of the South African Native Convention in Bloemfontein.(129) They were, however, informally represented by Silas T. Molema who had helped move a resolution stating that there be no change in the status of any of the Protectorates "without its consent, expressed by its chiefs, councillors, and people assembled in open Council."

The London arrival of the People's Delegation, in early July 1909, coincided with the simultaneous disembarking of a nineteen member "official" delegation made up of leading white South African politicians. At least some of the later party came prepared to press for a firm guarantee that HCTs would soon become part of the Union. Also shipped in, however, was a secret dispatch by General Methuen, the commanding officer of British forces in South Africa, "on the subject of the fighting strength and resources of the Basuto."(130) This report, which was widely circulated among the South African officials as well as within the Colonial Office, must have made for sober reading to any inclined to simply dismiss Basotho, and by extension Batswana and Amaswati, concerns:

"...The Basuto nation could probably put about 60,000-80,000 fighting men in the field. About 50 per cent of these would probably possess breech loading rifles...about half of the remainder would have firearms of some sort, and for close quarters they would have knockberries and battle axes or assegais. The leading feature of the Basutos as an enemy would be that every man would be mounted and well mounted. Probably they would fight as mounted infantry, dismounting and using their rifles, but they are a nation of horsemen, and quite capable of acting as units.

...At the start of the war they would almost certainly hold some of their historic strongholds, or even assemble in force to besiege Maseru or one of the other Residencies. If merely driven away then they would probably retire to their mountain fastnesses and adopt guerrilla tactics, which would be exceedingly difficult to put down..."

Lord Crewe held secret talks with the official South African delegates on 20-21 July 1909. (131) In his opening remarks the Colonial Secretary made it clear that his government "were prepared to see the bill through both as to franchise and as to representation." Most of the discussion then centred around proposed amendments to, and clarifications about, the Schedule. A guarantee against the partitioning of the territories after their incorporation was accepted, but amendments

proposed by the Resident Commissioners of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, which sought to institutionalize the status of the Chiefs and the Basutoland National Council were ruled out.(132)

Contemporary press reports confirm that, while the discussions about the South Africa Act were held in camera, the outcome of the talks was anticipated and understood by informed opinion. For the Batswana and their allies and sympathizers the challenge was to get the imperial government to commit itself as explicitly as possible to respecting indigenous opinion on the matter. In this context Gerrans apparently scoured a coup by getting The Times (London) to publish in full a "report of the meeting convened by Mr. Barry May in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, at which the subject of South African Union was officially discussed with the chiefs of the Protectorate."(136) Said report largely consisted of English translations of Bathoen, Linchwe and Sebele's January pitso testimony. On the previous day the transcript had been delivered by Gerrans to the Colonial Office. (133)

The publication of the Batswana leaders' views had an immediate, if immeasurable, effect on public discussions. One advantage the Dikgosi enjoyed, in contrast to the members of the Coloured and Native Peoples' Delegation, was unquestioned imperial credibility as spokesmen. Their appearance also challenged the stereotype, perpetuated as much by white liberal "negrophilists" as their "negrophobe" opposites, that "natives" naturally needed the assistance of others in articulating their interests. On this score Bathoen and Sebele's skill in elocution was the subject of a follow-up article in The Times entitled "The Vice of Generalities" which noted that: The speeches of these barbarian chiefs, even as reported in English, are far better reading then the speeches of most European statesmen."(134) The article went on to once more quote various passages, which were contrasted with "the coldness and staleness of modern civilized speech." Although possibly unrelated, it was only after publishing the dikgosi's words that The Times agreed to print letter submitted by non-white members of the People's Delegation. Reaction also came from South Africa, whose press now carried accounts of the Gaberones testimony.

A number of British backbench and opposition MPs now took up the Basotho-Batswana-Swazi cause. Among them was the Labour MP Keir Hardie, who first raised the issue of the Protectorates during question time when he asked (reportedly to Ministerial cheers) Crewe's Undersecretary, Colonel Seely.

(Hardie:) "...whether in the concurrence of all parties in the measure native opinion in the Protectorates has been taken into account, whether in the event of the time coming when it is proposed to transfer the Protectorates from the Crown to the new Parliament the House of Commons will be allowed to discuss the matter before it becomes finally binding?"

(Seely:) "as to the natives, we have taken every step we possibly could to ascertain what their wishes are. With regard to the second point, which is akin to it, as to the transfer of the Protectorates, I think I made it plain in my statement that the schedule to the Bill is permissive, that it arranges the broad principle in regard to native rights and immunities on which such a transfer shall be affect, if and when that transfer is desired by South Africa as a whole and is assented to by the Crown."

(Hardie:) "Including the natives?"

(Seely:) "Certainly when I say South Africa as a whole, I mean South Africa as a whole."(135)

In his response Seely had sidestepped the question of whether the Commons would have the opportunity for discussion prior to any change in the status of the Protectorates. But two weeks later, during formal Commons' debate on the South Africa Act, he, in response to further opposition queries, confirmed his government's commitment to allow the house to express its opinion before any transfer. In what subsequently proved to be a symbolically important promise, he went on to say that "the wishes of the natives in the territories will be most carefully considered before any transfer takes place."(136)

On 31 May 1910 the Union South Africa came into formal existence. This event coincided with the forwarding of three new petitions to "our Great Chief, Edward VII" from Bathoen, Khama and Sebele, that once more laid out their case for the preservation of the 1895 status quo.(137) The appearance of these appeals brought to a close the Batswana campaign to prevent their initial inclusion in the nascent closer Union, as well as the beginning of a new and much longer campaign to preserve their status outside the powerful settler ruled Dominion now established along their borders.

Postscript- Batswana and the formation of the A.N.C.

Two years after the Union was formed, some sixty delegates gathered in Bloemfontein to start a new regional all-African organization. Conference organizer, Pixley ka Seme, stressed that the new grouping should serve as a "united voice" not only for black South Africans but for Africans in the neighbouring Protectorates. He concluded by moving that "the delegates and representatives of the great native houses from every part of South Africa here assembled should form and establish the South African Native National Congress." A number of delegates then seconded this motion, including Mokgalagadi Moisakgomo, representing Kgosi Seepapitso II of the Bangwaketse. All the delegates voted to form the group, which was renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923. (138)

The move to form the ANC had not just begun in 1912, but was the product of many years of organizing. Many Batswana, including Bathoen I, Sebele, and Segale Pilane, had been active in supporting the growth of regional African politics. Both Sebele and Bathoen, unfortunately, died just before the Bloemfontein meeting. However, the conference recognized the efforts of Batswana by making Khama, Linchwe, and Kgosi Lekoko of the Barolong, "Honorary Vice-Presidents". Khama rejected his appointment, perhaps fearing that such an alliance would draw the Bangwato closer the affairs of the Union.

Linchwe also decided to remain personally aloof. Even so, he continued to be linked to the ANC for a long time. His brother, Kgari Pilane, served as the ANC treasurer. In 1921 Linchwe's son, Isang, tried to have the then ANC constitution adopted as the basis of the Native Advisory Council. This was rejected by the British. Meanwhile, in 1913 Peter Sidzumo was succeeded as Bakwena Tribal Secretary by his brother, Richard, who also served as the Secretary-General of the ANC's Bechuanaland and Griqualand West Provincial Congress.(139) The membership of this section, one of five regional divisions of the movement, was made up of Batswana from both

sides of the border. In 1916 the British invoked Proclamation no. 15 of 1907 to expel R. Sidzumo and a colleague named George Mashwe from the Protectorate. (140) The ties between Protectorate dikgosi and the ANC weakened in the mid-1920s when the movements fortunes temporarily declined.

NOTES

1. For events south of the Molopo see Kevin Shillington *The Colonization of the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900* (Braamfontein, 1985). For 1852-53 Batswana-Boer War see Jeff Ramsay "The Batswana-Boer War of 1852-53, How the Batswana Achieved Victory*" Botswana Notes and Records* Vol 23 (Botswana Society, Gaborone, 1991) 193-208.

2. State Archives Pretoria, Transvaal Archives (TA) SS. vol. 64 r 143/65 Sechele to M.W. Pretorius, 12 February 1865, letter also signed by Gaseitsiwe, Montshiwa, Mosielele, Makgosi and Mangope. Also SS. vol. 70 r 1206/65 D. Coetzee to M.W. Pretorius 13 November 1865. SS. vol. 67 r 632/65 T. Jensen to M.W. Pretorius.

3. S.M. Molema, *Montshiwa, Barolong Chief and Patriot*, (Cape Town 1966), 66-67. Also, BPP C.508. Ludorf's correspondence in Wesleyan Mission Papers (WMP), available on microfiche at the University of Botswana library. Molema papers at School of Oriental and African Studies Library (SOAS).

4. Molema, 67.

5. Shillington, *Southern Tswana*…,74-83. Also papers on 1878 conflict in BPP C.2220: Ford to Acting Colonial Secretary 4 July and Mackenzie to Lanyon 10 July, Lanyon to Frere, 24 August, Report of Lt-General Thesinger 30 July.

6. BPP C.2252 Warren to Lanyon 25 November 1878 and C.3635 "Summery of events in Bechuanaland by Colonel Warren".

7. BPP C.2220 Report of Alexander Balie's 1876-77 tour with enclosures, 12 March 1877. This mission was a follow up that of Coates Palgrave- Public Records Office (PRO) CO (Colonial Office) 879 (Confidential Print Series) 7/74 Report with enclosures by Palgrave to R. Southby (Lt. Governor of Griqualand West) 7 November 1874.

8. TA SS r. 1754/78, 3076/78, 789/79, 3204/80, 3369/80, 3773/80, 3870/80, 4525/80 and w. 207/79, 287/80. Botswana National Archives (BNA) Resident Commissioner (RC) 8/7, Melville Report and Agreement, and PP 1/3/2. BPP C.2220.

9. Shillington, *Southern Tswana…* Chapter 5, 123-43 for recent interpretation and classic study by J.A.I, Agar-Hamilton *The Road to the North* (London, 1937). BPP C.3098, 3381, 3419, 3486, 3686, 3841 contain key correspondence.

10. British perceptions of German push in PRO CO 879/22/274, 289, 292.

11. Official Correspondence by Mackenzie May-August 1884 in BPP C.4194 & C.4213.

12. BPP C.3841 R. Price to British Resident, Pretoria 30 May 1881 and Montshiwa to same 2 June 1881. Molema, p. 129. Shillington, p. 136, citing *Diamond Fields Advertiser* 30 January 1883.

13. Molema. 138.

14. BPP C.4213 Mackenzie to Robinson 5 August 1884 and J.M. Wright to C.J. Rhodes 5 September 1884. Molema. 139-141.

15. BPP C.4227. For contrasting accounts of the expedition by two participants see- Ralph Williams *The British Lion in Bechuanaland* (London, 1885) and John Mackenzie *Austral Africa, Losing It or Ruling It,* two volumes (London, 1887).

16. BPP C.4889 "Report of the Commission appointed to Determine Land Claims and to Effect a Land Settlement in British Bechuanaland".

17. Ian Colvin *The Life of Jameson* (London, 1926) vol. 2, 141-42: Shippard (urging the 1896 uitlander rebels to lay down their arms)- "Not a hair on your head will be touched." Trible (rebel leader)- "Do you know your Kafir name in Bechuanaland? They call you Marana-Maka, the Father of Lies!"

18. BPP C.4432 (also PRO CO 879/22/292)- Derby to Robinson 14 March 1885.

19. PRO CO 879/22/292- CO to Foreign Office (FO) 14 March and FO to CO 20 March; Derby to Robinson 14 March 1885.

20. BPP C.4839 Goold-Adams Report of 8 December in Robinson to Stanley 30 December 1885. PRO CO 879/23/305 Upington to Robinson 30 December in Robinson to Stanley 20 January 1886. National Archives of Namibia (NAN) ZBU 1857 U IV containing July 1886 map showing German claims in northern Botswana.

21. BPP C.4588 Minutes of Meeting at Molepolole 27 April 1885. Also, slightly different set of minute published in long article "Sir Charles Warren at Sechele's" *Diamond Fields Times* (Kimberley) 12 May 1885, reprinted in PRO CO 879/24/317 with cover letter Robinson to Derby 20 May 1885. Dutch account of meeting and minutes based on British Parliamentary Papers in former Transvaal security chief W.J. Leydes' *Het Insluiten van de Boeren-Republieken,* two volumes (Amsterdam, 1914) vol 2, 271-75.

22. BPP C.4588.

23. Cape Colony Parliamentary Papers (CPP) G.37-1885, Ministers to Governor/High Commissioner (HC) 7 March 1885, enclosing R. Price to T. Upington, 15 December 1884.

24. PRO 879/24/317 "Sir Charles Warren at Sechele's". Mackenzie *Austral Africa*, vol. 1, p. 240, notes that the Boer press was also full of stories of Warren being rebuffed at Molepolole.

25. Transvaal Argus (Potchefstroom) 10 June 1868.

26. BPP C.4588 "G" "Proposals of Chief Khama" 13 May 1885, signed by Khama and 43 others. Mackenzie's authorship- A.J. Dachs (edit.) *Papers of John Mackenzie* (Johannesburg, 1975) p. 195, letter to Mrs. Mackenzie 12 May 1885. The proposals were drafted by Mackenzie and recopied by Edwin Lloyd. Lloyd's oft quoted comment, LMS London Missionary Society Papers (LMS)(originals at London, microfiche copies at University of Botswana Library and BNA) Lloyd 1 June 1885, that Khama had "not taken any irrevocable step" is simply naive.

27. BPP C.4588 "Proposals of Chief Sechele" and "Proposals of Chief Gaseitsiwe"

28. BPP C.4588 Stanley to Robinson 13 august 1885.

29. LMS H. Williams 1889 Annual Report, Molepolole.

30. Shillington, p. 173.

31. For a detailed of how Rhodes obtained control over Zimbabwe see Arthur Kepple-Jones *Rhodes and Rhodesia, The White Conquest of Zimbabwe*, 1884-1902 (Queens University Press, Montreal 1983); also, John S. Galbraith *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British south Africa Company* (University of California Press, Berkeley 1974). Material on Moffat's role in son, R.U. Moffat's *John Smith Moffat* (London 1921). J.S. Moffat Papers located at Zimbabwe National Archives.

32. Paul Maylam *Rhodes, the Tswana and the British: Colonialism, Collaboration and Conflict in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1899* (Greenwood Press, Westport 1980), 50-55 [?]

33. PRO 879/30/369 (also BNA HC 24/7) Shippard's reports of meetings at Kanye 3 August, Molepolole 7 August and Mochudi 11 August 1888; Robinson to Knutsford 29 August, Knutsford to Robinson 4 October, Robinson to Knutsford 14 & 22 December. BNA PP 1/3/3 Shippard to Robinson 6 December 1888. BNA HC 24/41 Shippard to Moffat 11 December. Disturbed situation in Molepolole: BNA HC 24/24 A.J. Wookey to Shippard 21 September and HC 23/32 Wookey to Shippard 1 October 1888. LMS Wookey 30 October and 6 December. Also, BNA HC 42/44, HC 25/15 (telegraphic reports).

34. BNA PP 1/3/3 "Minutes of meeting of Bechuana Chiefs held at Kopong on Tuesday the 5th and Wednesday the 6th of February 1889". In addition to the three and Khama other dikgosi present included Pilane (Bakgatla baga Mmanaana), Ikaneng (Balete), Gaborone (Batlokwa) Kontle (Bahurutshe booManyana) and Kgari Macheng (pretender to Bangwato bogosi) along with "about 1,500 followers who were all present at the meeting."

35. BNA PP 1/3/3 Shippard to Robinson 6 February 1889.

36. BNA HC 26/34 Lt. Lochner to Col. Carrington, 15 March 1889.

37. BNA BNB 979 M. Williams (edit.) *Bechuanaland Protectorate Orders in Council and High Commissioner's Proclamations and notices 1891-1914* (Cape Town 1915).

38. Jeff Ramsay *The Rise and Fall of the Bakwena Dynasty of South-Central Botswana* (unpublished Boston University PhD. Thesis 1991; available through U.M.I. Dissertation Information Services) 201-213.

39. PRO CO 879/37/441 Shippard to Smyth 28 November 1889 and Knutsford to Loch 3 January 1890.

40. PRO CO 879/32/392 Loch to Knutsford 17 June 1890 enclosing 10 June legal opinion by W.P. Schreiner.

41. PRO CO 879/34/410 "Memorandum as to the Jurisdiction and Administrative Powers of a European State holding Protectorates in Africa" February 1990.

42. BNA BNB 979.

43. PRO CO 879/32/392 Shippard to Khama 16 December 1889.

44. PRO CO 879/32/392 Khama to Shippard 1 January 1889.

45. PRO CO 879/32/392, also WCW/SO- W.C. Willoughby Papers Shelly Oaks College. (WCWSO) file 642 Khama's Papers: Khama to Heany (Rhodes designated representative) 1 January 1889. File 642 also contains follow up letter Khama to Rhodes 7 February 1890- "I like your new plan for entering Mashonaland". Earlier Maurice Heany together with Frank Johnson had obtained a mining concession from Khama- also 879/32/392- "Agreement between Khama and the northern Goldfields Exploration Syndicate" 16 April 1887- which they subsequently managed on behalf of the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, whose Board reached an understanding with Rhodes in the early months of 1889- Maylam p. 53. Thereafter Rhodes looked upon the two to manage his relations with Khama. See also *Frank Johnson Great Days: The Autobiography of an Empire Builder* (London 1940).

46. BPP C.5918 Evidence of Enquiry held between 29 August and 7 September, enclosed with Shippard to Robinson 9 September 1888. Also related material in C.5524, PRO CO 879/29/358. Anthony Sillery *Founding a Protectorate, A History of Bechuanaland 1885-1895* (The Hague 1965), chapter 9; Paul Kruger *The Memoirs of Paul Kruger* (London 1902), vol 1, 214-16. A Schultz & A. Hammer *The New Africa: A Journey up the Chobe and Down the Okavango Rivers* (London 1897), 388-90.

47. This is well known see for example D.E. Needham, E.K. Mashingaidze and N. Bhebe's popular text *From Iron Age to Independence: A History of Central Africa* (Essex 1974/88) p. 132- Khama's messenger Makwatse also played a direct role in negotiating Lewanika's acceptance of the 1890 Lochner concession.

48. Needham et. al., 115-16.

49. PRO CO 879/39/459 Loch to Moffat 29 September, Loch to Goold-Adams 3 October, Loch to Ripon 11 October, Goold-Adams to Loch 14 October 1893. Mutero Chirenje *Chief Kgama and His Times, The Story of a Southern African Ruler* (London 1978) p. 52. Maylam, 120-23. Khama was paid 1000 pounds sterling for his mephatos services. Other services by Khama to Police see WCWSO File 642.

50. Correspondence related to crisis in BNA HC 114/1 and PRO CO 879/36/426 no. 71. See also Ramsay *The Bakwena Dynasty*.., 214-217.

51. PRO CO 879/37/441 Loch to CO 17 November 1892.

52. BNA 114/1 Shippard to Loch 2 March 1892.

53. BNA 114/1 Sebele's statement enclosed in Shippard to Loch 6 March 1892.

54. PRO CO 879/37/441 A.A. Baumann to C.O. 1 August 1892.

55. BNA HC 118; PRO CO 879/50/537 "Minutes and Report of Concessions Commission....

56. Papers related to Bakaa Crisis in BNA HC 114/3.

57. BNA HC 117 Surmon to Loch via Shippard 1 March, Loch to Ripon 2 May 1894. HC 114/3 Shippard to Loch 28 February 1894.

58. BNA Assistant Commissioner (AC) 2/1/2 Ratshosa to Ellenberger 23 April 1894. PRO CO 879/42/484 Cameron to Ripon with enclosures 2 May 1894. LMS H. Williams 6 August 1894.

59. BNA HC 196/1 & PRO CO 879/44/498: Petition by Khama and 128 others 28 June 1895, Petition by Sebele and 45 others 17 July, Petition by "Kgatla Raad" 27 July and Petition by Bathoen 31 July 1895. For a detailed account of Bathoen, Khama and Sebele's London Mission see Neil Parsons "The Visit of the Chiefs to England" (unpublished University of Edinburgh MA Thesis, 1967), which is currently being revised for publication. Also, WCW/SO File 54 for Willoughby's records of dikgosi's itinerary and expenses; BNA HC 196/1 and 1895 LMS correspondence.

60. PRO CO 879/44/498 Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to CO, 24 September 1895.

61. PRO CO 879/44/498 Khama, Sebele and Bathoen to CO, 4 November 1895.

65. BNA S. 466/3 HC to RC, 27 July 1936 encloses a copy of the minutes of the 6 November 1895 meeting between Bathoen, Khama and Chamberlain (Sebele was ill). Settlement in PRO CO 879/44/498 Chamberlain to Robinson and CO to Willoughby, both 7 November 1895, later also in BNA RC 2/8/1. "Half loaf" LMS Out Thompson to Mackenzie 14 March 1896.

62. BPP IX, 311 (telegram) Harris to Rhodes 11 November 1895: "we can obtain administration native reserves when public feeling permit, in meantime indefinite."

63. BNA HC 196/1 Chamberlain to Robinson 19 November 1895. The dikgosi were also informed before they left that they must grant Company Police the right of unrestricted transit- CO to Khama, Sebele and Bathoen 18 November 1895.

64. PRO CO 879/44/498 Chamberlain to Robinson, 30 December; (telegram) Chamberlain to Robinson 15 December 1895. BNA HC 196/1 Robinson to Newton 17 December 1895. Follow up- PRO CO 879/47/517 Bathoen to Chamberlain 3 April, Lloyd to Chamberlain 7 April and Goold-Adams to Bower 9 April 1896.

65. BNA HC 196/1 Chamberlain to Robinson 10 December 1895.

66. LMS Willoughby to friends in England.

67. For discussion of problems with data on labour migration see Ramsay *The Bakwena Dynasty*…, 252-69.

68. British Bechuanaland Annual Report 1896/97 (HMSO 1898) p. 10. LMS Willoughby 21 April, 29 June; Wookey 28 April, 18 September; Good 24 September 1897. CPP G.28-'96 "Rinderpest Conference". In Ngamiland the depletion of wildlife was so severe as to lead to a temporary contraction of the Tsetse fly belt around the Okavango- Andrew Murray "The North West" in F. Morton & J. Ramsay (edits.) *Birth of Botswana, A History of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 1910-66* (Gaborone 1987), 113-14.

69. LMS H. Williams 15 May 1896.

70. [?] John Brown *Diamond Fields Advertiser* (Kimberley) 7 November 1896. Also, WCWSO Willoughby to Harry 3 June 1896. Lugard Papers, Rhodes House, Ngamiland Expedition Private Diaries, May-June 1896.

71. British Bechuanaland Annual Report 1896/97p. 10.

72. LMS H. Williams "Annual Report Molepolole, 1896". Similar sentiments were written by Lloyd 15 September and Mary Partridge 27 November 1896.

73. LMS H. Williams 6 & 27 June 1898.

74. LMS Annual Report Kanye, 1898. Wookey 11 & 29 September 1898.

75. British Bechuanaland Annual Report 1896/97p. 10.

76. LMS H. Williams 31 July 1896. Also, PRO CO 879/46/515 Newton to Robinson 24 October 1896. Annual report of the London Missionary Society(1897), p. 6.

77. LMS Wookey 29 December 1898.

78. PRO CO 879/78/702 RC to HC 7 October, and HC to RC 8 November 1902; 879/81/717 HC to Secretary of State for Colonies (SSCO) 15 December, with enclosures; 879/91/802 SS to HC 2 March and HC to SSCO 2 July 1906 with enclosures. Additional references in BNA Sebele I Out Correspondence 1904-08, LMS Willoughby to Cousins 14 August 1897, AC 6/13 and Ellenberger Papers, Rhodes House "Early Days of the Protectorate" p. 95.

79. Information from Barry Morton whose study of the rise and fall Sekgoma Letsholathebe is forthcoming.

80. David Massey *Labour Migration and Rural Development in Botswana* (unpublished Boston University PhD. Thesis, 1981) p. 70.

81. PRO CO 879/52/552 Surmon to Goold-Adams 21 April 1899.

82. BNA 2DC (District Commissioner) Molepolole, Criminal Record Book 1918-37.

83. BNA DC Molepolole 2/9 Annual Reports 1919-29- 1923-24 Report, 8 March 1925.

84. BNA RC 12/16 AC (South) to RC, 31 March 1905, on sources of royal income; BNA Sebele Out Correspondence (SOC) Sebele to Act. AC (South) August or September 1908: "Eating up is the only physical force which a chief has at his command to keep his people in order; although it is often abused for political purposes, it is absolutely necessary as being the only means he has of commanding obedience to the law." Also, BNA 47/3.

85. Account of rebellion in Shillington, *Southern Tswana…*227-241.

86. PRO CO 879/53/552 "Extract from Diary kept in Assistant Commissioners office at Gaberones, 5 August 1897 (NB: there were no white officials at the meeting).

87. LMS H. Williams 2 September 1897.

88. See Warwick, P, 1983, *Black People in the South African War*. Braamfontein: Raven

89. LMS Wookey 28 November 1899 and 6 May 1900, Lloyd 4 December 1899.

90. Warwick, *Black People*…, 384-6.

91. WCWSO file 733I. Also, Schapera *A Short History of the Bakgatla baga-Kgafela* (Mochudi 1980). F. Morton "Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in Two Colonial Worlds: The Bakgatla baga Kgafela of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Transvaal 1877-1966" in I. Asiwaju (edit.) *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries 1884-1984* (London 1985) 127-54.

92. Legal aspects of the case discussed A.J.G.M. Sanders *Bechuanaland and the Law in Politicians Hands* (Gaborone 1992) Chapter 2, 15-32, a more detailed analysis by Barry Morton forthcoming. Also, Ralph Williams *How I became a Governor* (London 1913) 324-333. Much documentation in WCWSO file 751 as well as colonial files, notably PRO CO 879/91/802.

93. BNA BNB 979. PRO CO 879/95/872, HC to SSCO 11 March 1907.

94. Kings Bench, "Court of Appeal Judgment The King versus The Earl of Crewe: *Ex parte* Sekgoma 25 April 1910."

95. Oxford University: Bodleian Library, Special Collections: Ellenberger Papers, 1908 Journal, 99-100.

96. HC to SS, January 7, 1907 in Papers Relating to the Federation of South African Colonies (HMSO, July 1907) PRO CO 879/97/897, correspondence w/enclosure HC to CS, May 4, 1908.

97. Sebele's original duplicate copy in BNA SOC, Sebele to Acting Assistant Commissioner South (ACS) for Resident Commissioner (RC) May 23, 1908. Additional copy with related correspondence in PRO CO 879/97/897 HC to CS, July 20, 1908. Other related papers BNA S 39/7.

98. Unfortunately very little is known about Peter Sidzumo, some details about him and his relationship with Sol Plaatje can be found in Brian Willan *Sol Plaatje, A Biography* (Raven, 1984) and John Comaroff (edit.) *The Boer War Diary of Sol T. Plaatje* (Raven, 1973), as well as his correspondence in BNA SOC. The Cape Archives should have papers related to Sidzumo's employment as a civil servant c. 1898-1906.

99. PRO CO 879/97/897, HC to CS June 1, 1908 w/enclosures.

100. BNA SOC Sebele to Letsie May 30, 1908; also, Sidzumo to Makepe July 18, 1908, Sidzumo to Editor, "*Basutoland Star*" (*Naledi ea Lesotho*) August 22, 1908 and Sidzumo to Modise September 9, 1908.

101. BNA SOC, draft dated June 6, 1908. Copies sent to *Diamond Field Advertiser, Izwi Labantu and Naledi ea Lesotho* newspapers.

102. BNA S 39/7 HC to SSCO, June 22, 1908.

103. PRO CO 879/106/900, He received it from RC, June 20, 1908.

104. PRO CO 879/97/897, HC to CS August 24, 1908 w/enclosures

105. PRO CO 879/106/900, HC to CS July 15, 1908, also 879/97/897, HC to CS, July 20, 1908.

106. PRO CO 879/106/900, CS to HC July 17, 1908.

107. PRO CO 879/106/925, no. 6 South African Federation, Memorandum by Sir C. Lucas, September 17, 1908.

108. PRO CO 897/106/925, HC to CS December 28, 1908 w/enclosures. Also, memo: "South African Closer Union Convention and Native Protectorates", October 5, 1908.

109. PRO CO 897/106/925, HC to deVilliers October 26, 1908 w/enclosures.

110. BNA S 39/7 and PRO CO 879/97/897, HC to RCs (BP and Basutoland), June 30, 1908.

111. BNA SOC Sebele to Segale and Sidzumo to Segale, August 7, 1908.

112. BNA SOC Sidzumo to Bathoen September 17, 1908.

113. BNA S 39/6 Bathoen to ACS October 14, 1908.

114. BNA SOC Sidzumo to Sekgome September 18, 1908.

115. PRO 879/106/900, 3 secret telegrams HC to CS December 18, 1908, also HC to CS December 30, 1908.

116. BNA S 39/7 and PRO CO 879/100/927, HC to RC December 28, 1908.

117. BNA S 39/7, Act. RC to HC January 12, 1909 w/enclosures "My friend Khama and the Bamangwato People".

118. BNA S 39/7, Act. RC to HC January 12, 1909.

119. Published in *The Times* (London) July 24, 1909.

120. *The Times* July 24, 1909.

121. BNA S 39/7, Act. RC to HC January 12, 1909. *The Times*: "she also confirmed with a ring given to each of the chiefs; it is a token that what had been agreed upon should not be upset. Is that not what a ring signifies marriage?." (Nb. May believed that the rings had actually been given by then CS Joseph Chamberlain.)

122. BNA S 39/7 Sebele to HC, January 8, 1909, letter to RC January 27; Linchwe to RC, January 11; Baitlotle to ACS January 18; and BNA S 39/6 Bathoen to HC February 2. Copies in PRO CO 879/100/927.

123. PRO CO 879/100/927 Gerrans to CS, July 22, 1909 w/enclosures.

124. Khama III Papers, Khama III Memorial Museum, Serowe, Out Letters 1898-1922, Sebele to Khama April 9, 1909.

125. BNA S 39/5, Resident Magistrate Serowe to Government Secretary, May 1909.

126. For history of the Delegation see Andre Odendaal *Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912* (London 1984), Chapter 9.

127. Eric Walker *W.P. Schreiner, A South African* (Oxford, 1937) 323-24. Odendaal, p. 210. W.P.'s brother Theophilus had already captured the attention of the Colonial Office with a series of pro-Basotho articles- PRO CO 879/97/897 HC to CS October 5, 1908.

128. PRO CO 879/100/927 HC to CS April 5, 1908 and "Resolutions of the South African Native Convention" in T.G. Karis, G.M. Carter and Sheridan Johns (edits.) *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa*, 1882-1964 vol. 1 "Protest and Hope 1882-1934" (Stanford, 1973) 53-54.

129. PRO CO 879/106/925 enclosed in Governor of Cape Colony to SSCO, June 7, 1909.

130. PRO CO 879/106/933.

131. PRO CO 879/100/927, HC to CS, July 3, 1909; also, BNA 39/7.

132. *The Times*, July 24, 1909.

133. PRO CO 879/100/927 Gerran to Earle July 22, 1909.

134. *The Times*, July 28, 1909.

135. Hansards Parliamentary Debate, vol. 9 new series- July 27, 1909

136. Hansards, vol. 9 new series- August 16, 1909.

137. BNA S 39/5 Khama to the King April 24 1910; S 39/6 Bathoen to the King April 30 1919; S 38/2 Sebele to the King August 16, 1910 (according to minute by RC, November 15, 1910, the petition was delayed by Sebele's serious illness.")

138. Odendaal, *Black Protest Politics*…, 270-85.

139. Mweli Skota *The African Yearly Register, Being an Illustrated National Biographical Dictionary (Who's Who) of Black Folks in Africa* (Johannesburg 1931) p.

140. BNA S 25/10 RC to HC 17 January 1917, DC Molepolole 2/10, 2/14, 4/12.